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We construct a model of international trade and multinational production (MP) to examine the impact
of globalization on the skill premium in skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. The key mechanisms
in our framework arise from the interaction between three elements: cross-country differences in factor
endowments and sectoral productivities, technological heterogeneity across producers within sectors,
and skill-biased technology. Reductions in trade and/or MP costs induce a reallocation of resources
towards a country's comparative advantage sector (increasing the skill premium in skill-abundant countries
and reducing it in skill-scarce countries) and within sectors towards more productive and skill-intensive
producers (increasing the skill premium in all countries).
We parameterize the model to match salient features of the extent and composition of trade and MP
between the U.S. and skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries in 2006. We show that a reduction in
trade and MP costs, moving from autarky to 2006 levels of trade and MP, increases the skill premium
by roughly 5% in skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. We also show that the growth in US trade
and MP between 1966 and 2006 accounts for 1/9th of the 24% rise in the US skill premium over this
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The nature of globalization has changed. The value of world trade as a share of world output, the
sales of foreign a¢ liates as a share of world output, and the developing world￿ s share of this global
activity have grown tremendously over the last few decades. Over this period there was also a large
increase in income inequality, both in developed and developing countries, as measured for example
by the rise in the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers￿ the skill premium. The changing
nature of globalization and the increase in the skill premium raise a set of important questions. To
what extent can the growth of trade and multinational production (MP) account for the rise in the
skill premium in developed and developing countries? What are the di⁄erent implications for the
skill premium in developed countries of globalization with developing countries versus globalization
with developed countries?
In this paper we construct a multi-country model of international trade and MP to address
these and other questions. Our framework extends the classic model of trade and inequality, the
two-factor (skilled and unskilled labor) Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, in three key dimensions.
First, as in much of the recent trade literature our framework incorporates productivity di⁄erences
not only across sectors but also across producers within sectors, motivated by the large observed
heterogeneity in size and export status within sectors; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999).1 We
introduce heterogeneous, perfectly competitive producers building on the Eaton and Kortum (2002)
model. Second, our framework allows for an arbitrary factor bias of technology. When technology
is skill biased, a producer￿ s productivity is positively correlated with its skill intensity. This feature
of the model enables us to address in a simple way the empirical evidence that exporters and large
producers in manufacturing tend to be relatively skill intensive; see e.g. Bernard et. al. (2007) for
the US, Bustos (2007) for Argentina, Verhoogen (2008) for Mexico, AlcalÆ and HernÆndez (2009)
for Spain, and Molina and Muendler (2009) for Brazil. Third, motivated by the fact that sales of
US foreign a¢ liates are larger than the value of US exports, our model incorporates multinational
production (MP), giving producers the ability to use their technologies, at a cost, to produce
in foreign countries, as in Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). Our extended model provides
additional channels, beyond those in the standard H-O model, through which globalization a⁄ects
the skill premium.
In Section 3, we examine analytically the workings of simpli￿ed, two-country versions of our
model that abstract from MP. We prove that starting in autarky, a reduction in trade costs generates
what is often called the Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect in the standard H-O model, which we refer to as
the between e⁄ect: labor reallocates between sectors as countries specialize in their comparative
1Other models that combine elements of H-O and either Ricardian or Krugman-style models include Tre￿ er (1993)
and (1995), Davis (1995), Harrigan (1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Romalis (2004), Costinot (2005), Chor (2008),
and Morrow (2008). While these papers focus on the role of endowment and technology di⁄erences in explaining
observed trade patterns, our focus is on the impact of globalization on the skill premium.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 2
advantage sector, increasing the skill premium in the country with a comparative advantage in the
skill-intensive sector and reducing the skill premium in the other country. Our model features a
simple mechanism to explain the observation that the between e⁄ect is weak in the data (see e.g.
Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007): for a ￿xed share of trade in output, greater productivity dispersion
across producers within sectors mitigates the between e⁄ect. We show, however, that the strength
of the between e⁄ect is fully determined by the factor content of trade.
Next, we show that if technology is skill biased, reductions in trade costs increase the skill
premium through what we refer to as the within e⁄ect: as trade costs decline, the relative demand
for skill increases because labor shifts within sectors towards the most productive producers, which
have the highest skill intensities. Hence, trade liberalization increases the relative demand for
skill, analogous to the e⁄ect of skill-biased technological change. This prediction receives empirical
support in Bustos (2007) and Bloom et. al. (2009). We are not the ￿rst to model the potentially
important interaction between skill-biased technology, international trade, and inequality; see e.g.
Acemoglu (2003) and Yeaple (2005).2 Our paper contributes to this literature by including both
trade and MP, nesting the within and between e⁄ects, and quantitatively assessing the strength of
these e⁄ects.
Our analytic results suggest that the between e⁄ect and the within e⁄ect both lead to an in-
crease in the skill premium in skill-abundant countries in response to a reduction in trade costs.
On the other hand, these e⁄ects push the skill premium in opposite directions in skill-scarce coun-
tries. Which force dominates and by how much is a quantitative question that we address in our
quantitative analysis.
To do so, in Sections 4 and 5 we present a parameterized four-country version of our model,
with two symmetric skill-abundant countries and two symmetric skill-scarce countries. In these
sections we abstract from MP in order to isolate the impact of international trade on the skill
premium. We calibrate the model to match, for the US, the trade share, the composition of trade
with skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries, and the factor content of trade, all in 2006. We also
match the volume and composition of trade for the average skill-scarce country (instead of matching
this data for any individual skill-scarce country). We choose the degree of skill bias of technology
to target the relative skill intensity of exporters to non-exporters in Mexico, for which there is
detailed information on worker educational attainment by producer. With skill-biased technology,
a key implication of our model is that trade shares (relative to sectoral expenditures) are relatively
higher in skill-intensive manufacturing sectors, a prediction borne out in US manufacturing data.
We use the parameterized model to conduct a series of counterfactuals. We ￿rst consider
a reduction in trade costs moving from autarky to the level of trade in 2006, holding all other
exogenous variables ￿xed. This is a "but for" analysis (see Krugman 2000): What would the skill
2See also the work of Matsuyama (2007), Zeira (2007), Helpman et. al. (2008), Vannoorenberghe (2008), Ver-
hoogen (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2009).Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 3
premium be, but for the availability of international trade opportunities? The rise in the skill
premium caused by trade is 1:8% in the US (and the other skill-abundant country) and 2:9% in
skill-scarce countries. The skill premium rises in all countries because the within e⁄ect is relatively
strong compared to the between e⁄ect. The between e⁄ect is weak because, in our parameterization
as in the data, the factor content of trade in the US is not very high. Because, under our baseline
parameterization, the between e⁄ect is weaker than the within e⁄ect for the US, we conclude that
how much the US trades matters more for its skill premium than with whom the US trades.
The relatively small trade share in the US plays a critical role in explaining the relatively small
impact of trade on the US skill premium in our model. International trade, however, is only one
form of globalization. Multinational production (MP) is another important form of globalization.
For example, in 2006, sales of majority-owned, non-bank US foreign a¢ liates were more than twice
as large as US exports. To study the impact of MP on the skill premium, in Section 6 we extend our
model and assume that producers are able to use their technologies to produce abroad, at a cost.
Hence, MP reduces the technological gap between producers in di⁄erent countries and increases
the relative importance of factor endowment di⁄erences in shaping patterns of specialization. With
Hicks-neutral technology, we show that this strengthens the between e⁄ect of globalization on
the skill premium. With skill-biased technology, we show that MP strengthens the within e⁄ect: a
reduction in MP costs between two symmetric countries leads to an increase in the skill premium in
both countries because producers that engage in MP tend to be the most productive (and, thus, the
most skill intensive). Previous theoretical work that ￿nds an impact of MP on inequality requires
that countries di⁄er in their factor-endowment ratios and/or their TFP￿ s.3 The contribution of our
￿nding is that we obtain a positive e⁄ect on the skill premium of MP even between countries with
similar endowment ratios and TFP￿ s, which in the data account for the vast majority of MP.4
We use the extended model to simulate a reduction in trade and MP costs moving from autarky
to the volume and geographic composition of international trade and MP in 2006 in the US￿
holding all other exogenous variables ￿xed. The rise in the skill premium is 4:8% in the US
(and the other skill-abundant country) and 6:5% in the skill-scarce countries. Combined with the
previous counterfactual, this result suggests that MP is at least as important as international trade
for determining the impact of globalization on the skill premium. In order to assess the extent to
which the growth of trade and MP can account for the rise in the skill premium between 1966 and
2006 in the US, we consider a second counterfactual in which we choose parameters to match the
growth of trade and MP between these years. In this counterfactual we do not hold endowments or
technologies ￿xed, but instead we target the increase in the supply of skilled labor and the greater
growth of the skill-scarce countries between 1966 and 2006 and we allow for exogenous skill-biased
3See e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and (1997), Zhu and Tre￿ er (2005), Antras et. al. (2006), Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2009).
4See e.g. Navaretti and Venables (2004) for evidence that most FDI ￿ ows take place between advanced countries,
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technology growth to match the 24% increase in the US skill premium (see Acemoglu and Autor
2010). In our preferred, baseline parameterization, we show that in the absence of globalization,
the rise in the skill premium in the US would have been 1=9th smaller than the observed rise in the
skill premium over this time period.5
Whereas in this paper we use a structural, parameterized model to quantify the impact of
international trade and MP on the skill premium in skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries, the
literature has mostly focused on three alternative approaches that emphasize: the factor content of
trade, as in Katz and Murphy (1992); the extent of between-sector factor reallocation, as in Berman
et. al. (1997); and the mandated wage equation, as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999). We show in
Section 7 that while each of these alternative approaches may provide estimates of the impact of
international trade on the skill premium via the between e⁄ect, they do not capture the impact of
the within e⁄ect of trade and MP. Using data generated by our model, in which the within e⁄ect
is relatively strong, we show that these approaches underestimate the rise in the skill premium in
skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.
While our quantitative results echo those in previous research ￿nding that globalization is not
as important as the combination of other forces in shaping the recent rise in the skill premium, our
work has two advantages. First, our model, in contrast to the standard H-O model upon which
most previous work is based, is not inconsistent with a number of empirical regularities. These
empirical regularities￿ which include (i) the rise in the skill premium in skill-scarce countries, (ii)
the lack of a large rise in the relative price of skill-intensive goods accompanying the large rise in the
US skill premium, and (iii) the lack of extensive factor reallocation towards skill intensive sectors
in developed and developing countries￿ have been used often as evidence against the importance
of globalization in accounting for the rise in the skill premium in both skill-abundant and skill-
scarce countries; see e.g. Acemoglu (2002), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), and references therein.
Second, our model incorporates two important forces in the debate on globalization and the skill
premium￿ the within e⁄ect and the role of MP￿ that are largely absent in previous quantitative
work.
2 Basic Model of International Trade
Our model economy features I countries indexed by i = 1;:::;I. Aggregate quantities of inelastically
supplied unskilled and skilled labor in country i are Li and Hi, respectively. Each country produces
a ￿nal non-tradeable good using a continuum of intermediate goods that can be traded subject to
an iceberg cost. Intermediate goods are grouped into J sectors, indexed by j, in order of increasing
skill intensity of production. Within each sector j there are a continuum of subsectors, indexed
5In a less conservative parameterization￿ in which we choose parameter values so that, given trade and MP shares,
the between and within e⁄ects are strengthened￿ we ￿nd that in the absence of globalization the rise in the skill
premium in the US would have been 1=5
th smaller than the observed rise over this time period.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 5
by ! 2 [0;1]. Within each subsector, intermediate good producers from the same country share
the same level of productivity. Productivity varies across subsectors, sectors, and countries. Goods
markets and factor markets are perfectly competitive, and factors are perfectly mobile across sectors
and subsectors but are immobile across countries. We assume that countries have balanced trade
every period. Given that equilibrium allocations and prices are determined in a static fashion, we
abstract from time subscripts.
The ￿nal non-tradeable good, denoted by Qi, is produced in all countries by competitive pro-
ducers that use an identical CES aggregator, which places equal weight on intermediate goods from


















Here, Qi (j) and qi (!;j) denote country i￿ s use of the sector j aggregate good and the subsector
(!;j) good, respectively; and ￿;￿ > 0 are the elasticities of substitution between sectors and
between subsectors, respectively.
Facing prices Pi, Pi (j) and pi (!;j) for the ￿nal non-traded good, the aggregate sector j good,
and the subsector (!;j) good, respectively, pro￿t maximization by the ￿nal good producers gives













The output of each subsector is produced by intermediate good producers. Goods within
each subsector are perfect substitutes and potentially produced by every country. The ￿nal good
producer purchases each intermediate good from the lowest cost source of that good in the world.
Our assumptions on the production of intermediate goods are as follows. A country i producer
in subsector (!;j) hiring h units of skilled labor and l units of unskilled labor, produces output y
according to a constant returns to scale production function

















where ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers at the level of
an individual producer, ￿j 2 [0;1] determines the relative importance of skilled labor in sector j,Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 6
e ’ 2 [0;1] shapes the skill bias of technology (as described below), Ai (j) > 0 is country i￿ s Hicks-
neutral productivity in sector j, and z is the producer￿ s idiosyncratic component of productivity.
To facilitate exposition, we decompose Ai (j) into two components￿ national TFP, Ti, and sectoral
TFP, Ti (j)￿ so that Ai (j) = Ti ￿ Ti (j).
Note that if e ’ = 1=2, then Equation (2) simpli￿es to a standard CES production function with
multiplicative productivity Ai (j)z. If e ’ 6= 1=2 and ￿ 6= 1, then technology is not multiplicative. In
general, facing wages of unskilled and skilled labor w and s respectively, a cost minimizing producer










where ’ ￿ 2(2e ’ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1) is the skill-bias of technology, which determines the e⁄ect of a pro-
ducer￿ s productivity on its relative demand for skill. We say that technology is Hicks-neutral if
’ = 0 (i.e. if e ’ = 1=2 or ￿ = 1), so that h=l is independent of z. In contrast, we say that technology
is skill biased if ’ > 0 (i.e. if e ’ > 1=2 and ￿ > 1 or if e ’ < 1=2 and ￿ < 1), so that h=l increases
with z.
Each country i draws a subsector-speci￿c idiosyncratic component of productivity zi (!;j) > 0,
henceforth denoted z when the dependence on i and (!;j) is clear. Within a given country,
producers in each subsector have access to a common z. We model subsector-speci￿c productivity
draws as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). In an arbitrary subsector and
country z = u￿￿, where u is an i:i:d: random variable that is exponentially distributed with mean
and variance 1 in all countries. The parameter ￿ > 0 determines the dispersion of productivity
across subsectors.6 Note that while the subsector-speci￿c component of productivity z is i:i:d: across
subsectors, sectors, and countries, the sectoral component of productivity Ai (j) can potentially be
systematically correlated with a sector￿ s skill intensity and a country￿ s factor endowment.
We introduce trade barriers using iceberg transportation costs: delivering a unit of intermediate
good from country i to country n requires producing ￿in ￿ 1 units in i, where ￿ii = 1 for all i and
￿in ￿ ￿ik￿kn for all n;i;k 2 I. Denote by cin (!;j) the unit cost of intermediate good producers in
















With e ’ = 1=2 so that technology is Hicks-neutral, the unit cost of a given subsector (!;j)
can be written as the cost of the factor bundle for all subsectors in sector j, vi (j), divided by the
6As in EK, we must constrain the values of ￿ and ￿ to have a well-de￿ned price index. In the skill-biased case,
however, we cannot derive an analytic expression for this constraint. In all simulations, we check numerically that
the price level is well de￿ned.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 7












This case corresponds to the Eaton and Kortum 2002 (henceforth EK) setup with a factor bundle
that combines skilled and unskilled labor.
With perfect competition, the price of the subsector (!;j) good in country i is
pi (!;j) = minfcki (!;j)g
I
k=1 (5)


























where Iin (!;j) is an indicator function that equals one if country n imports subsector (!;j) goods
from country i and equals zero otherwise.
The amount of skilled and unskilled labor demanded by subsector (!;j) in country i in order
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We assume that countries spend all of their income on the ￿nal non-traded good, which implies
balanced trade:
PiQi = siHi + wiLi. (11)
An equilibrium of the world economy is a set of aggregate prices [Pi;wi;si]i2I, aggregate quan-
tities [Qi]i2I, sector and subsector prices [Pi (j)]i2I;j2J and [pi (!;j)]!2[0;1];i2I;j2J, sector and sub-
sector quantities [Qi (j)]i2I;j2J and [qi (!;j);yi (!;j)]!2[0;1];i2I;j2J demanded and produced, and
factor demands [li (!;j);hi (!;j)]!2[0;1];i2I;j2J, that satisfy ￿nal and intermediate goods produc-
ers￿optimality conditions, factor and goods market clearing conditions, and trade balance in each
country.
Solution algorithm: Equilibrium factor prices can be solved as follows. Given factor prices, the
marginal cost of each subsector/country is given by Equation (4): Given marginal costs, prices are
calculated using Equations (5) and (6), and Equation (5) also gives the identity of the supplier
of each good in each country, summarized by Iin (!;j). Unskilled and skilled labor hired by each
subsector, normalized by output of the ￿nal good, is obtained from Equations (1), (7), and (8) and
output of the ￿nal good is then obtained using one of the labor market clearing equations in each
country, either Equation (9) or (10). Equilibrium factor prices must satisfy the remaining labor
market clearing equation in each country and balanced trade, Equation (11) (by Walras￿Law, and
given the choice of a numeraire, one of these equations is redundant).
In the solution procedure above, in order to calculate which country supplies each good in each
country, we must compare marginal costs, Equation (4), across all potential suppliers, as indicated
by the pricing equation (5). In the special case of Hicks-neutral technology, the marginal cost is
given by the product of the inverse of productivity and the cost of the factor bundle. In this case, if
productivities are exponentially distributed, we obtain simple analytic expressions that characterize
the probability that country i supplies country n with an arbitrary sector j subsector (as in EK).Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 9







EK show that ￿in (j) is also equal to country i￿ s revenue share of sector j in country n. This closed-
form solution for ￿in (j) considerably simpli￿es the solution algorithm to calculate equilibrium factor
prices because it implies that the amount of unskilled (and skilled) labor used in country i sector j
to supply n, which is
R 1
0 lin (!;j)d! in Equation (9), can be written as a simple function of factor
prices, aggregate prices, and aggregate quantities.
With non-Hicks-neutral technology, we do not obtain such analytic expressions because unit
cost cannot be expressed as the product of the inverse of productivity and the cost of the factor
bundle in the expression for marginal cost, Equation (4). Hence, we must simulate marginal cost
draws across a large number of subsectors and for each subsector compare them numerically across
countries.
3 International Trade and the Skill Premium
In this section, we conduct analytic comparative statics on the skill premium in our basic model
of international trade under simplifying assumptions, which we relax in the quantitative section.
The appendices provide proofs of all lemmas and propositions. Our goal is twofold: (i) to provide
intuition for the key mechanisms operating in our framework and (ii) to gain insight into how to
parameterize the model. We focus, in particular, on two central interactions: those between pro-
ductivity heterogeneity and country di⁄erences, in Subsection 3.1, and those between productivity
heterogeneity and skill-biased technology, in Subsection 3.2. In both subsections we maintain the
following simplifying assumption.
GEN There are two countries, I = f1;2g; trade costs are symmetric, ￿ ￿ ￿12 = ￿21; and the
elasticity of substitution between sectors is one, ￿ = 1.
3.1 Hicks-Neutral Technologies and Asymmetric Countries
In this subsection we study a special version of the model, close to standard models in the literature,
in which we assume that ￿ = 1 and e ’ = 1=2. With Cobb-Douglas production functions, skilled
labor￿ s share of revenue in sector j is equal to ￿j (￿ = 1). With either ￿ = 1 or e ’ = 1=2, technology
is Hicks-neutral, ’ = 0. We assume that e ’ = 1=2 so that the productivity of a z-type producer in
sector j is Ai (j)z, as in standard models such as EK.
In this speci￿cation of the model, the impact of international trade on the skill premium can
be inferred from what is called the factor content of trade, which we de￿ne below. Denote byGlobalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 10
NXL
i and NXH
i the units of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, embodied in country i￿ s net
exports. That is, if country i produces a positive amount in all sectors NXL
i =
P




j Hi (j)￿i (j); where Li (j) and Hi (j) denote the employment of unskilled and skilled
labor in country i sector j, respectively; and where ￿i (j) equals the ratio of country i￿ s net exports
in sector j to country i￿ s total revenue in sector j:7
￿i (j) =
XI
n=1 [￿in (j) ￿ ￿ni (j)]PnQn
XI
n=1 ￿in (j)PnQn
Proposition 1 provides a simple relationship between the units of unskilled and skilled labor em-
bodied in country i￿ s net exports and associated changes in factor prices. We prove the following
proposition in Appendix A in a more general environment with asymmetric trade costs and with
arbitrarily many sectors, factors, and countries.
Proposition 1 Let si=wi, NXL
i , NXH
i , Li, and Hi denote country i￿ s skill premium, factor con-







i under another set of parameters, where skill-intensities (￿j￿ s) are constant across the sets of

















Proposition 1 extends the results in Deardorf and Staiger (1988) to a framework in which
technologies are heterogeneous within sectors and, unlike Deardorf and Staiger (1988), holds even
if a country produces no output in a subset of sectors. Burstein and Vogel (2010) extend this and
all results in Section 3.1 to an imperfectly competitive environment with heterogeneous ￿rms.










according to Proposition 1 corresponds to the percentage change in the skill premium that results
from moving away from autarky if ￿ = ￿ = 1, and e ’ = 1=2. Note that changes in the factor content
of trade, and therefore the skill premium, are caused by changes in either factor endowments or the
units of unskilled and skilled labor embodied in a country￿ s net exports. In particular, if Hi falls or
Li rises, then the skill premium rises, all else equal. If NXH
i rises￿ country i exports more skilled
labor￿ this is equivalent to a reduction in Hi, which causes the skill premium to rise. Similarly, if
NXL
i falls￿ country i imports more unskilled labor￿ this is equivalent to an increase in Li, which
causes the skill premium to rise.
In the remainder of this subsection, we conduct comparative statics exercises on the skill pre-
mium under Assumption GEN and the following assumption, which imposes an additional restric-
tion that there are two sectors:




i that is well-de￿ned when country i produces no
output in any given sector.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 11
HN There are two sectors, J = fx;yg with sector x relatively skill intensive, ￿y < ￿x; production
functions are Cobb Douglas, ￿ = 1; and e ’ = 1=2.
In order to study the e⁄ects of trade on the skill premium under the assumptions imposed in
this subsection, we must introduce the concept of comparative advantage. We say that country
1 has a comparative advantage in sector x if v1 (x)=v1 (y) < v2 (x)=v2 (y) in autarky. While
comparative advantage is de￿ned as a condition on relative composite input bundle costs in autarky,
it is straightforward to show that if country 1 has a comparative advantage in the x sector, then
v1 (x)=v1 (y) < v2 (x)=v2 (y) in any trade equilibrium with positive trade costs. Hence, if country 1
has a comparative advantage in the x sector, then it is a net exporter in the x sector if trade shares
are positive (￿12 (x) > ￿12 (y)). Under the assumptions imposed in this subsection, the necessary








where a = A1 (x)A2 (y)=A1 (y)A2 (x) indexes country 1￿ s Ricardian comparative advantage (if
a > 1) or disadvantage (if a < 1) in sector x. This condition is a strict generalization of comparative
advantage in the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models. If a = 1, so that there is no Ricardian
comparative advantage, then country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x if and only if
H1=L1 > H2=L2, exactly as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. If endowment ratios are the same across
countries, H1=L1 = H2=L2, so that there is no Heckscher-Ohlin-based comparative advantage, then
country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x if and only if a > 1, exactly as in the Ricardian
model.
We are now equipped to study the e⁄ects of a trade liberalization on the skill premium. Starting
in autarky, a reduction in trade costs leads to reallocation of factors between sectors towards a
country￿ s comparative advantage sector. This increases the relative demand and, therefore, the
relative price of the factor that is used intensively in the comparative advantage sector. We refer
to this force as the between e⁄ect of globalization on the skill premium. This result is summarized
in the following corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions GEN and HN hold. Reducing trade costs from autarky to any
positive level of trade increases s1=w1 and decreases s2=w2.
In any equilibrium with positive trade, country 1 is the net exporter in sector x under Condition
(13). Because sector x is skill intensive, this implies that in any equilibrium with positive trade,
country 1 has positive net exports of skilled labor and negative net exports of unskilled labor, while
the reverse is true in country 2. The corollary then follows directly from Proposition 1.
When there are no productivity di⁄erences between sectors and subsectors, our model is similar
to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which the location of production of each subsector is determinedGlobalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 12
solely by trade costs and factor endowments. In this case, Corollary 1 captures what is often called
the Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect. However, in our model a given subsector￿ s location of production
is determined not only by trade costs and factor endowments, but also by sectoral productivities
and within-sector idiosyncratic productivities. A higher dispersion of productivities within sectors
(a higher ￿) increases the relative importance of the idiosyncratic component of production costs.
Intuitively, if ￿ is very high, then in any subsector one country is likely to have a much higher
subsector-speci￿c productivity than the other, and this country is likely to export in this subsector
even if it has a comparative disadvantage in the sector. Hence, for given trade shares (country 1￿ s
trade share is ￿21 (x) + ￿21 (y) and country 2￿ s trade share is ￿12 (x) + ￿12 (y)), if ￿ is higher, then
country 1￿ s net exports of skilled (unskilled) labor are smaller (larger), which results in a smaller
factor content of trade.
On the other hand, a higher value of a increases the relative importance of the systematic
Ricardian component of comparative advantage (recall that country 1 has a comparative advantage
in the x sector). Intuitively, if a is very high, then country 1￿ s comparative advantage in the x sector
is likely to be su¢ ciently strong to overcome even large idiosyncratic productivity disadvantages in
a given sector x subsector, so that country 1 is likely to export in this sector x subsector. Hence,
for given trade shares, if a is higher, then country 1￿ s net exports of skilled (unskilled) labor are
larger (lower), which result in a greater factor content of trade. The following proposition con￿rms
this intuition.8
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions GEN and HN hold. If ￿ and T1=T2 are chosen to match ￿xed
trade shares, then the increase in s1=w1 and the decrease in s2=w2 caused by moving from autarky
to these trade shares is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in a.
Proposition 2 provides comparative static results on the impact of key parameters on the
strength of the between e⁄ect. However, from the discussion above, the percentage change in
the skill premium of moving from autarky to any positive trade shares is fully pinned down by the
factor content of trade. In particular, conditional on keeping the factor content of trade ￿xed, the
percentage change in the skill premium is independent of our particular choice of ￿, a, and factor
endowments. This logic guides our choice of targets when quantifying the strength of the between
e⁄ect in Section 4.
8In Proposition 2 we hold trade shares constant, rather than holding trade costs constant, while varying ￿ and a
for two reasons. First, as we increase ￿ holding trade costs constant, the impact on the skill premium is ambiguous
because trade shares rise and greater volumes of trade tend to strengthen the between e⁄ect, all else equal. Second,
in our quantitative analysis we assess the strength of the between e⁄ect by calibrating the model to match observed
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3.2 Skill-Biased Technology and Symmetric Countries
In this subsection, we conduct comparative static exercises on the skill premium under Assumption
GEN and the following assumption.
SB There is one sector: J = 1; the sector-level aggregator is Cobb Douglas: ￿ = 1; technology is
skilled biased: ’ > 0; and countries are symmetric: H1 = H2, L1 = L2, & A1 (j) = A2 (j) = 1.
The assumption that countries are symmetric and that there is a single sector abstracts from the
between e⁄ect, allowing us to isolate the within e⁄ect. The assumption that ￿ = 1 simpli￿es
the algebra: a consequence of ￿ = 1 is that, in the factor demand equations, the direct e⁄ect of
a reduction in trade costs￿ less labor is required to sell a given quantity of output in the foreign
market￿ and the indirect e⁄ect￿ falling export prices increase the quantity sold in export markets￿
exactly o⁄set each other. With skill-biased technology, we cannot solve explicitly for ￿in (j), unlike
under Assumptions GEN and HN. However, we are able to obtain analytic comparative static
results without this explicit solution.9
If countries are symmetric and technology is Hicks-neutral, ’ = 0, then reductions in the cost
of trade do not a⁄ect the skill premium. On the other hand, if technology is skill biased, ’ > 0,
then reductions in the cost of trade increase the skill premium. The intuition behind this result is
as follows. As in standard models with heterogeneous productivities (Ricardian or heterogeneous
￿rm models), reductions in trade costs induce a reallocation of factors of production within sectors
towards relatively productive producers. With skill-biased technology, relatively productive pro-
ducers are also relatively skill intensive; see Equation (3). Hence, trade liberalization increases the
relative demand for skill and the skill premium. This result is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If Assumptions GEN and SB hold, then si=wi is strictly decreasing in ￿ for i = 1;2.
Summary of comparative statics on international trade and the skill premium: To sum-
marize the ￿ndings in this section, the results in Propositions 1 and 3 suggest that the between
e⁄ect and the within e⁄ect both lead to an increase in the skill premium in skill-abundant countries
in response to a reduction in trade costs. On the other hand, these e⁄ects push the skill premium in
opposite directions in skill-scarce countries. According to Proposition 2, a higher value of idiosyn-
cratic productivity dispersion weakens the between e⁄ect￿ and, as we quantitatively show below,
strengthens the within e⁄ect￿ and hence increases the likelihood that the skill premium also rises
in skill-scarce countries. Which force dominates and by how much is a quantitative question that
we address in our quantitative analysis.
9Because we do not require a closed-form solution for ￿in (j), our results in this subsection do not make use of the
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4 Baseline Parameterization with International Trade
In this section, we study the quantitative implications of a reduction in trade costs on the skill
premium in a parameterized version of our model. We ￿rst present the quantitative model, which
relaxes Assumptions GEN, HN, and SB and introduces a non-tradeable sector. We then calibrate
our model to match salient features of the data on US and the average skill-scarce country￿ s trade
with skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. Finally, we present our baseline results on the
implications of reductions in trade costs on the skill premium.
4.1 Quantitative model
We extend our analytic model by introducing a non-tradeable sector (matched to service producing
sectors in the data) in addition to the tradeable sector (mainly matched to goods producing sectors
and merchandise trade in the data, although sometimes matched to manufacturing due to data
availability). We do so to account for the relatively high share of non-traded service sectors in the
US and many other countries. In particular, we assume that the ￿nal good in country i is produced
according to (Qi)
￿ (Ni)
1￿￿, where Qi denotes output of the ￿nal tradeable good, as modeled in
Section 2, and Ni denotes output of the ￿nal non-tradeable good.10 We model production of non-
tradeable goods exactly as in Section 2, but we abstract from trade in services by assuming that
trade costs in these sectors are in￿nite. We assume that labor is perfectly mobile between the
tradeable and non-tradeable sectors.
We consider a world economy that is composed of four countries: two ex-ante identical skill-
abundant countries, countries 1 and 2, and two ex-ante identical skill-scarce countries, countries 3
and 4. That is, countries 1 and 2 (and countries 3 and 4) are identical in all respects but in their
ex-post realizations of country/subsector-speci￿c productivity draws. We parameterize country 1
to match US data, and country 3 to match data for the average skill-scarce country, as described
below.
We believe that our four-country setup is not too restrictive to quantify the strength of the
between e⁄ect on the skill premium since, as we showed above, under Assumptions GEN and HN
this e⁄ect is pinned down by the factor content of trade, which we target in our calibration. To
assess the role of our assumption that there are four countries for the strength of the within e⁄ect,
we performed a sensitivity exercise in which we changed the number of symmetric skill-abundant
or skill-scarce countries and found that, following our calibration strategy, the percentage change
in the skill premium did not vary much.11
10In our sensitivity analysis, we allowed for an elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable sectors
di⁄erent from one. Our quantitative results were largely una⁄ected by varying this elasticity over a wide range of
values.
11We do not consider a world economy with a larger number of asymmetric countries because with many countries
it becomes computationally infeasible to choose bilateral trade costs to exactly match bilateral trade shares. ThisGlobalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 15
4.2 Parameterization
The parameters that we must choose are the skill bias of technology, ’; the within-sector dispersion
of productivity, ￿; the elasticity of substitution across sectors and subsectors, ￿ and ￿; the elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor at the level of an individual producer, ￿; the
share of tradeables in ￿nal output, ￿; the country-sector TFP levels, Ai (j) = Ti ￿ Ti (j); the
labor endowments, Hi, Li for i = 1;3; the sectoral skill intensities, ￿j￿ s; and the trade costs ￿12,
￿13, and ￿34. It is straightforward to show that, for given endowment ratios Hi=Li and other
parameter values, trade shares and the skill premia only depend on population size and aggregate
TFP through the ratio (T1L1)=(T3L3). Hence, without loss of generality we set T1 = L1 = L3 = 1.
We assume that the sectoral component of TFP, Ti (j), is a linear function of skill-intensity ￿, with
Ti (median j) = 1. We normalize T1 (j) = 1, which leaves us with one parameter left to choose,






where j￿ min and j￿ max are the sectors with the lowest and highest ￿￿ s, respectively. A positive
value of t3 means that country 3 is relatively more productive in unskill-intensive sectors.
General strategy: Our central objective is to quantify the strength of the between and within
e⁄ects of globalization on the skill premium, with special emphasis on the US. We use our theoretical
results to guide our calibration strategy. Consider ￿rst the between e⁄ect. Proposition 1 implies
that if ￿ = 1, and e ’ = 1=2 (so that only the between e⁄ect is active), and ￿ = 1, then the ratio of the
skill premium with trade to the skill premium under autarky is equal to the factor content of trade.
Motivated by this result, our calibration targets the factor content of trade in the tradeable sector.
We acknowledge, however, that in our calibrated model￿ in which we do not impose ￿ = ￿ = 1 or
e ’ = 1=2￿ the factor content of trade does not exactly pin down the strength of the between e⁄ect.
Now consider the within e⁄ect of going from autarky to ￿xed trade shares. Based on our
theoretical results, for a given share of total sales accounted for by exporters, the strength of
the within e⁄ect is largely shaped by the di⁄erence in skill intensity between exporting and non-
exporting producers within a sector. Given trade shares, the larger is either the share of sales of
exporters or the di⁄erence in skill intensities between exporters and non-exporters, the larger is
the increase in the demand for skill as labor shifts towards exporting producers in response to a
trade liberalization. Motivated by this logic, our calibration targets these two moments. Note that
the di⁄erence in skill intensity between exporters and non-exporters is increasing in the elasticity
is because, with skill-biased technology, to solve the model we must simulate productivity draws across a large
number of subsectors, and for each subsector compare marginal costs numerically across countries, as discussed
above. Two common aproaches to reduce the number of parameters have been used in environments with Hicks-
neutral productivities. The ￿rst approach is to choose a parametric relationship between bilateral trade costs and
bilateral country characteristics (see e.g. EK 2002, Fieler 2007, and Waugh 2009). However, this approach does
not match bilateral trade volumes for each country, which are essential for determining the strength of the between
and within e⁄ects. The second approach is to make use a model￿ s implied analytic sectoral gravity equations, which
summarize all relevant information about trade costs, as in Dekle et. al. (2008). However, this aproach is infeasible
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of skill intensity to productivity ’, while the share of sales accounted for by exporters (for a ￿xed
trade share) is increasing in the dispersion of subsector productivities ￿ when ￿ > 1.12 Finally,
given that the rise in the demand for skill, starting in autarky, is increasing in the magnitude of
the trade shares, we also target these in our calibration.
Speci￿cs of calibration: We calibrate our model using data for 2006 or the closest years with
available information. We ￿rst determine the set of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries that we
map into our four-country model economy. Using the educational attainment dataset described in
Barro and Lee (2000), we rank countries by their most recent data on the average years of education
for the population over age 25. We consider a country to be skill abundant if this average is greater
than 6.9 years. According to this cuto⁄, Mexico is the most skilled of the skill-scarce countries
and Italy is the least skilled of the skill-abundant countries. We set the ratio of endowment ratios
(H1=L1)=(H3=L3) = 0:49 to match the population-weighted average of education levels in the
skill-abundant countries relative to the unskill-abundant countries, and we set H1=L1 = 0:71 as in
Acemoglu (2002). Recall that under Assumptions GEN and HN, given the FCT, country-sector
TFP￿ s and ￿xed endowments do not a⁄ect the strength of the between e⁄ect of moving away from
autarky.
We set the share of tradeable goods in ￿nal output, ￿ = 0:26, to match the share of good
producing sectors in US gross output in 2006, exclusive of government sectors.13 We assume that
there are 100 tradeable sectors and 100 non-tradeable sectors, and that each sector contains 1200
subsectors. As noted above, we calibrate many of our parameters using manufacturing data, as
opposed to data from all goods producing sectors. The sectoral skill intensities, ￿, are uniformly
distributed over the range 0:1 and 0:6 to roughly match the range of skill intensities of manufacturing
sectors in the US.14 For symmetry, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between sectors
equals the elasticity of substitution between subsectors, ￿ = ￿.15 We set the value of this elasticity
at ￿ = 2:7, to match the median sectoral elasticity for SITC 5-digit industries in the US estimated
by Broda and Weinstein (2006).
We choose the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor at the level of
an individual producer, ￿ = 1:2, to roughly match the aggregate elasticity of substitution of 1:4
between skilled and unskilled labor estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992). In particular, we set ￿
so that, given other parameter values, a change in the relative endowment of skilled labor results in
12If ￿ = 1, then with symmetric countries, export sales equal domestic sales, independent of trade costs. Hence, in
this case, matching trade shares immediately pins down the total share of sales accounted for by exporters.
13This is based on data from the Bureau of Economic Statistics. Good producing sectors include agriculture,
forestry, ￿shing, hunting, mining, and manufacturing.
14Our measure of sectoral skill intensity is the sectoral share of non-production worker employment, obtained from
the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for 2002.
15In our sensitivity analysis, we considered a lower elasticity of substitution across sectors ￿. This reduces the
strength of the within e⁄ect, so that globalization induces a smaller rise in the skill premium, because trade liberal-
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a change in the skill premium that is consistent with that estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992).
This procedure yields a value of ￿ that is lower than 1:4 due to inter- and intra-sectoral labor
reallocation in response to a change in factor endowments.
We set the value of the seven remaining parameters, (i ￿ iii) trade costs ￿12, ￿13, and ￿34,
(iv) aggregate TFP in country 3, T3, (v) the parameter that controls the linear slope of sectoral
productivities, t3, (vi) the dispersion of subsector productivities ￿, and (vii) the skill-bias of tech-
nology ’, to match seven moments. These are (i) the average of merchandise exports and imports
relative to gross output of goods producing sectors in the US;16 (ii) the average of merchandise
exports and imports relative to gross output of goods producing sectors in skill-scarce countries;17
(iii) the share of US imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries;18 (iv) the ratio of
merchandise trade between skill-scarce countries relative to total merchandise trade of skill-scarce
countries;19 (v) the factor content of US manufacturing trade20; (vi) the ratio of aggregate sales of
exporters relative to non-exporters in US manufacturing;21 and (vii) the average (across sectors) of
the logarithm of the skill intensity of exporters relative to non-exporters in Mexican (i.e. country
3) manufacturing, for which there is detailed information on worker educational attainment by
producer.22 In constructing moments (vi) and (vii) in our model, we assume that within each
exporting subsector, all producers export. This is one among many other con￿gurations because,
16Merchandise trade is given by trade in goods from the BEA, and gross output of goods includes the sectors listed
above. The resulting goods trade share in country 1 is 25:3%. We match the share of trade in gross output as opposed
to value added, because our model abstracts from intermediate inputs in production.
17We ￿rst obtain the share of merchandise trade in total output as the product of the two following numbers:
(i) the average of merchandise exports and imports relative to the combined GDP of skill-scarce countries, equal to
26:6% in 2006 based on information from the IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics and WDI; and (ii) the median share
of value added in gross output, equal to 0:5, across the set of unskill-abundant countries with available input-output
data as reported by the OECD. The implied share of trade in gross output in goods￿producing sectors is equal to
0:266=2=￿ = 50:9%:
18The share of U.S. imports in manufacturing from skill-abundant countries was equal to 0:59 in 2006.
19This statistic is based on information from the IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics, and is equal to 20:6% in 2006.
20We de￿ne sectors in the data using 4-digit SIC codes. We obtain sectoral gross output and sectoral employment
of skilled, Hi (j), and unskilled, Li (j), workers (which we de￿ne as non-production and production workers) as well as
total manufacturing employment of skilled and unskilled workers using the 2005 NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database (which is why we use the factor content of manufacturing trade). With sectoral gross output and net exports





Using these NXi￿ s and total manufacturing employment of skilled and unskilled labor, we obtain the factor content
of manufacturing trade.
21Using data from the 1992 U.S. Census of Manufactures (reported in Bernard et. al. 2003), this ratio equals 1:49.
This follows from the fact that the average exporter￿ s sales are 5:6 times larger than those of the average non-exporter,
and the fact that 21% of ￿rms are exporters.
22From unpublished Mexican manufacturing plant-level data for 1998, Verhoogen (2008) calculates by sector the
share of skilled workers (relative to the sector￿ s employment) in exporting and non-exporting plants, where skilled
workers are those with 12 or more years of education. The average across sectors of the log of the relative skill
intensity of exporters to non-exporters is 0:19. We do not target the skill intensity premium of US exporters reported
in Bernard et. al. (2007), because it is constructed using a less perfect measure of skill intensity: the non-production-
worker share of employment. Using their measure of skill intensity and a slightly di⁄erent procedure than the one
in Verhoogen (2008), they ￿nd that US exporting plants are 11% more skill intensive than non-exporting plants.
Following Bernard et. al.￿ s procedure in our model, the skill intensity premium of exporters in country 1 is 7:2%.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 18
with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the distribution of size and exporting status
across producers within subsectors is not uniquely pinned down.
Table 1 displays the parameter values in our baseline parameterization and Table 2 reports the
targets that we used in our calibration. Our baseline value of ￿ = 0:2 falls within the range of
￿￿ s estimated by others, although the gravity equations that give rise to these estimates do not
apply with skill-biased technology. For example, EK estimate ￿ 2 [0:08;0:28], Donaldson (2008)
estimates ￿ 2 [0:14;0:26], Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) estimate ￿ = 0:14, Simonovska
and Waugh (2010) estimate ￿ = 0:22, and Waugh (2009) estimates ￿ = 0:18. In our baseline
parameterization, skill-scarce countries have a relatively low productivity in skill-intensive sectors
(i.e. T3 (j) is negatively sloped). However, with t3 = 0:06, the variation in the systemic component
of productivity across sectors is very small, only a 6% di⁄erence between the least and most skill-
intensive sectors.23 Given the high skill intensity of exporters relative to non-exporters in Mexico,
our calibrated value of the degree of skill bias in technology is ’ = 0:33. In our parameterization,
the resulting share of trade (i.e. the average of exports and imports) in total output is equal to
6:6% in country 1 and 13:3% in country 3. Note that we choose a relatively low level of aggregate
productivity in country 3, T3 = 0:29￿ which implies that country 3 is relatively small in terms
e¢ ciency units￿ because the skill-scarce countries￿share of global trade is less than 50% while
their average trade share is greater than in the US, country 1. Finally, our target factor content of
trade of 0:018 in the tradeable sectors in country 1 anticipates a weak between e⁄ect: if ￿ = ￿ = 1
and ’ = 0, then moving from autarky to the 2006 levels of trade in an economy composed of only
tradeable sectors results in a rise in the skill premium of only 1:8%.
Our parameterized model with skill-biased technology implies a positive relation between a sec-
tor￿ s skill intensity and the level of normalized trade (de￿ned as the ratio of exports plus imports
to output minus net exports). This is illustrated in Figure 1 under our baseline parameterization.
Figure 1 also shows that this relation is essentially ￿ at in a parameterization of our model with
Hicks-neutral technology. We prove this result in Proposition 6 in Appendix C under Assumption
GEN and a two-sector version of Assumption SB. Intuitively, the interaction between skill intensity
and subsector-speci￿c productivity￿ which implies that z is relatively more important in the pro-
duction function in skill-intensive sectors￿ causes the same distribution of underlying productivities
in all sectors to yield a more dispersed distribution of unit costs in skill-intensive sectors. Hence,
a given productivity advantage, zi > z￿i, provides country i producers in skill-intensive sectors a
relatively larger cost advantage than in the unskill-intensive sector. With positive trade costs, it is
more likely that a good in a skill intensive sector is traded.24
23This is consistent with empirical evidence in Morrow (2008) that country-sector productivities are not very
correlated with the sectors￿factor intensities or country endowments.
24This result is similar to that in Fieler (2007), which predicts that one sector is more traded than another, but
unlike Fieler (2007) does not rely on an assumption that the distribution of productivities is more dispersed in one
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We ￿nd some supportive evidence of this prediction of the model by regressing measures of US
normalized trade￿ de￿ned as the average of exports plus imports, divided by gross output plus net
imports￿ in manufacturing sectors, using the BEA￿ s detailed IO tables for the 2002 Benchmark, on
skill intensity, measured by the share of non-production workers. In all speci￿cations we considered,
the coe¢ cient on skill intensity is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level.25
5 Baseline Results with International Trade
In this section we study the implications of international trade on the skill premium. To do so, we
use our parameterized model to conduct the following counterfactual. We consider a reduction in
trade costs starting in autarky (￿in = 1) to the levels of trade costs that generate the volumes
of international trade observed in 2006, while holding ￿xed all other parameters at our baseline
level. One way to interpret this counterfactual is that it answers the question: But for international
trade, by how much would the skill premium change?
Rows 12 and 13 in Table 2 report the log-percentage change in the skill premium, si=wi, resulting
from this experiment. The US and the other skill-abundant country (countries 1 and 2) experience
a 1:8% increase in the skill premium while the skill-scarce countries (countries 3 and 4) experience
a 2:9% increase in the skill premium. The two central messages from these results are as follows.
First, in contrast to the standard H-O model upon which most work on trade and the skill premium
is based, our parameterized model is consistent with a rising skill premium in all countries. The
skill premium rises in skill-scarce countries because the within e⁄ect is stronger than the between
e⁄ect. Second, the magnitudes of the changes in the skill premium of moving from autarky to 2006
levels of trade are quite small relative to, for example, the 24% rise in the (composition-adjusted)
US College-High School wage gap between 1966 and 2006 (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Autor 2010).
In what follows, we explain in detail the key features of our parameterized model that give rise to
these two ￿ndings.
5.1 Within E⁄ect Stronger Than Between E⁄ect
The rise in the skill premium in the skill-scarce countries reveals that the between e⁄ect is weak
relative to the within e⁄ect. This can be understood in two parts. First, we show that, consistent
with Proposition 2, the parameters that determine (i) the dispersion of subsector productivities and
(ii) sectoral productivity di⁄erences play a central role in shaping the strength of the between e⁄ect.
Given the information we use to calibrate these two parameters, we obtain a weak between e⁄ect.
Second, we show that the dispersion of subsector productivities and the skill bias of technology
25To our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to identify this relationship in the data. We acknowledge that there are
alternative mechanisms that could also lead to this pattern in the data. For example, an alternative hypothesis is
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play a central role in determining the strength of the within e⁄ect. Given the information we use to
calibrate these two parameters, we obtain a relatively stronger within e⁄ect. We also examine the
implications of the relative strength of the within e⁄ect for how the skill abundance of a country￿ s
trade partners determines the e⁄ect of a trade liberalization on that country￿ s skill premium.
5.1.1 Between E⁄ect
The strength of the between e⁄ect is determined by the factor content of trade, which￿ conditional
on trade shares￿ is largely shaped by two parameters: the dispersion of subsector productivities, ￿,





. Proposition 2 states that
the magnitude of the change in the skill premium resulting from the between e⁄ect is decreasing
in ￿ and increasing in t3. We now illustrate the quantitative relevance of this proposition in
our parameterized model, which relaxes Assumptions GEN and HN. We focus on the role of the
parameter ￿ although a similar exercise could be conducted with t3.
To isolate the quantitative e⁄ect of ￿ on the between e⁄ect, we assume that technology is Hicks-
neutral, ’ = 0, as in Proposition 2. Figure 2 depicts the percentage change in the skill premium in
countries 1 and 3 as they move from autarky to the baseline shares of trade in output, for levels of
￿ ranging from 0:02 to 0:35. Note that the strength of the between e⁄ect is signi￿cantly weakened
as we raise ￿. For example, increasing ￿ from 0:02 to 0:10 (which is at the low range of the value of
this parameter used in the literature) reduces the change in the skill premium in all countries by
about 1=3.
While di⁄erent values of ￿ and of t3 are consistent with a weak or strong between e⁄ect, our
choice of the combination of these parameters is constrained by the factor content of trade in the
data. Any combination of ￿ and t3 that yields small net exports of skilled labor and small net
imports of unskilled labor will yield only a weakly positive between e⁄ect. This result echoes those
that have led others in the labor and trade literatures to conclude that the impact of trade on the
skill premium is quite weak.
5.1.2 Within E⁄ect
The strength of the within e⁄ect￿ conditional on trade shares￿ is largely shaped by two parameters:
the skill bias of technology, ’, and the dispersion of subsector productivities, ￿. Panel A of Figures
3 and 4 depict the percentage change in the skill premia in countries 1 and 3 as they move from
autarky to the baseline shares of trade in output, for values of ’ ranging from ￿0:2 to 0:7 and ￿
ranging from 0:02 to 0:35, respectively.
Panel A of Figure 3 reveals that the change in the skill premium is increasing in ’. Intuitively,
the di⁄erence in skill intensities of a high-z producer and a lower-z producer is strictly greater, the
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producers to expand, the increase in the relative demand for skill is strictly greater, the higher is
’. When ’ = 0, only the between e⁄ect is active, and hence the skill premium rises in country 1
and falls in country 3, as in Figure 2. When ’ > 0, both the between and within e⁄ects are active.
For ’ ￿ 0:15 (less than half of our preferred value of ’ = 0:33), the within e⁄ect dominates the
between e⁄ect in country 3, in the sense that the skill premium increases there. Note that changes
in ’ have a relatively larger impact on the change in the skill premium in country 3 than in country
1. This is because￿ under our parameterization￿ country 3 is relatively small (in e¢ ciency units),
so that export sales relative to domestic sales are relatively greater in country 3, which implies that
the fraction of exporters is lower in country 3 than in country 1. Hence, the di⁄erence between the
skill intensity of exporters and non-exporters is greater in country 3 than in country 1 (our target
moment (vii) de￿ned above is 0:19 in country 3 and 0:17 in country 1), and the sales of exporters
relative to non-exporters is greater in country 3 than in country 1 (our target moment (vi) de￿ned
above is 2:0 in country 3 and 1:5 in country 1). Hence, because country 3 is relatively smaller,
the within e⁄ect is stronger in country 3 than in country 1. This explains why, in our baseline
parameterization, the skill premium rises by more in country 3 than in country 1, despite the fact
that the between e⁄ect reduces the skill premium in country 3.
Panel A of Figure 4 reveals that the change in the skill premium is increasing in ￿ in country 3
and is non-monotonic in ￿ in country 1. This is because the impact of increasing ￿ on the between
and within e⁄ects push the skill premium in the same direction in country 3 but in opposite
directions in country 1: the between e⁄ect is weakened with a higher value of ￿, as shown in Figure
2, and the within e⁄ect is strengthened with a higher value of ￿. Intuitively, as ￿ rises the within
e⁄ect becomes stronger because the relative di⁄erence in productivity between expanding (high-z)
and contracting (low-z) producers increases. Thus, labor reallocation across producers as a result
of a decline in trade costs induces a greater increase in the relative demand for skill, the greater is
￿.
While di⁄erent values of ’ and ￿ are consistent with a weak or strong within e⁄ect, Panel B
of Figures 3 and 4 illustrates how our choices of ’ = 0:33 and ￿ = 0:2 are constrained by (i) the
di⁄erence in skill intensity between exporting and non-exporting producers and (ii) the share of
sales of exporters relative to non-exporters, both of which we target in our calibration. At ’ = 0:33,
￿ = 0:2, and t3 = 0:056, the within e⁄ect is stronger than the between e⁄ect.
How robust is our conclusion that the within e⁄ect is stronger than the between e⁄ect to our
measure, in the data, of the factor content of trade? In order to address this question, we vary the
factor content of trade by changing the extent of sectoral di⁄erences in productivity, t3. Panel A
of Figure 5 illustrates the impact of changing t3 on the skill premium and Panel B illustrates the
impact of such a change on the factor content of trade. As t3 increases, so that country 3 becomes
relatively more productive in unskill-intensive sectors, the between e⁄ect becomes stronger. Note
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t3 ￿ 0:426 (more than seven times our baseline value of t3), so that country 3 has a substantial
Ricardian comparative advantage in unskill-intensive sectors. At this value of t3, the factor content
of trade is 0:08, more than four times the value of 0:018 used in our baseline parameterization. This
sensitivity analysis on how the factor content of trade a⁄ects the relative strength of the between
e⁄ect helps address concern, see e.g. Krugman (2008) and Feenstra (2010), that aggregation at the
sector level￿ which implies that the factor content of trade observed in the data underestimates
the true factor content of trade￿ may bias downward the estimated strength of the between e⁄ect.
Our results show that this aggregation bias would need to be substantial (i.e. raising our target by
roughly a factor of four) in order to overturn our result that the within e⁄ect is relatively strong.
5.1.3 Trade partners￿skill endowment and the skill premium
To what extent does the skill abundance of a country￿ s trade partners matter for determining the
impact of trade liberalization on that country￿ s skill premium? To address this question, we conduct
a counterfactual in which we hold trade shares ￿xed but shut down international trade between
skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries (so that the between e⁄ect is inactive). In particular,
we calculate the change in the skill premium in country 1 of moving from autarky to a modi￿ed
version of our baseline 2006 parameterization in which (i) skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries
do not trade with each other and (ii) trade shares in skill-abundant countries are ￿xed at their 2006
baseline level. The skill premium rises by 1:25% in country 1, which corresponds to roughly 70%
of the 1:8% rise in the skill premium of moving from autarky to our baseline that includes trade
between skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries (we do not report these results in the tables).
We also consider an alternative counterfactual in which we move from autarky to a modi￿ed
version of our baseline 2006 parameterization in which H3=L3 is set equal to H1=L1. We obtain a
similar result: the skill premium rises by 1:25% in country 1.
We conclude from these counterfactuals that factor endowment di⁄erences across countries
account for roughly 30% of the increase in the skill premium in country 1 generated by international
trade. This suggests that while with whom a country trades matters for the impact of trade on its
skill premium, how much a country trades is more important, a point that we now address.
5.1.4 Trade Shares and Small Changes in Skill Premium
To what extent is the small US trade share responsible for the small impact of trade liberalization
on the US skill premium that we ￿nd in our baseline parameterization? To answer this question,
we consider two alternative counterfactual exercises in which we increase trade shares.
In the ￿rst counterfactual, we raise the share of tradeables ￿ in ￿nal output so that, while we
continue to match the share of trade in tradeables, the overall share of trade in country 1 coincides
with the 8:4% US trade share including trade in both goods and services (recall that in our baselineGlobalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 23
calibration we only consider trade in goods, so that the US trade share is 6:6%, due to a lack of
services data in many other countries). In this counterfactual we keep the share of trade in skill-
scarce countries unchanged. The rise in the skill premium of going from autarky to this modi￿ed
baseline is 2:4% in country 1, instead of 1:8% (we do not report these results in the tables).
In the second counterfactual, we set the share of tradeables in gross output ￿ to 1, and match
the current share of trade in tradeables. That is, we abstract from the nontradeable sector of the
economy. This results in an overall share of trade in country 1 of 25:3%. The rise in the skill
premium in country 1, starting in autarky, is 6:8%. An alternative interpretation of this exercise
is that, if there is no labor mobility between tradeable and nontradeable sectors, then the skill
premium in the tradeable sector rises by 6:8%.26
We conclude from these counterfactuals that in our model, obtaining large changes in the skill
premium from trade requires unreasonably high trade shares relative to current US trade shares.
This suggests that, given the relatively small current trade shares in the US, international trade
may not be the central force shaping its skill premium.
6 Multinational Production
In this section, we extend our model by incorporating multinational production (MP). In Section 6.1
we introduce MP into our model and conduct comparative static exercises on the skill premium.
In Section 6.2 we parameterize the full model with international trade and MP and study the
implications for the skill premium of moving from autarky to 2006 levels of international trade and
MP. Finally, In Section 6.3 we calculate the contribution of globalization to the observed rise in
the US skill premium between 1966 to 2006.
6.1 MP and the Skill Premium
We model MP as enabling intermediate good producers to use their technologies in foreign countries.
Producers choosing to engage in MP incur a per-unit cost. In particular, country k producers in
subsector (!;j) thatoperate in country i incur a per-unit cost of MP given by ￿ki ￿ mki (!;j).
The country-level per-unit cost of MP, ￿ki ￿ 1, is analogous to the per-unit cost of exporting
and we similarly assume ￿ii = 1. As in Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), we introduce a
country/subsector-speci￿c e¢ ciency loss of MP, with mki (!;j) = mkn (!;j) ￿ 1 for all i;n 6= k
and mii (!;j) = 1, in order to obtain an interior equilibrium for the subsectors that engage in MP
versus exports; if we did not include this idiosyncratic MP cost, then producers from one country
supplying a foreign country would all do so either by exporting or by MP.
26We also consider a more extreme counterfactual of moving to free trade in both the tradeable and nontradeable
sectors, by setting the share of tradeables in gross output ￿ to 1, and by eliminating trade costs (￿in = 1 for all
i;n 2 I). The overall trade share is now 59% in country 1 and 88% in country 3. Starting in autarky, the skill
premium rises by 9:8% in country 1 and by 12% in country 3.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 24
Goods in subsector (!;j) can be supplied to country n in I2 ways: production can take place in
any of the I countries and production can use productivity from any of the I countries. We denote
by ck
in (!;j) the per-unit cost of supplying (!;j) to country n by producing in country i and using




















where we omit the dependence of mki and zk on (!;j). Note that if country k producers locate
in country i, then they use their own productivity zk and TFP Ak (j), but they use country i
labor and hence incur country i￿ s labor costs, si and wi. For simplicity, in what follows in this
section we consider the case with two countries and symmetric country-level MP costs (we drop
this assumption in the quantitative analysis in Sections 6.2 and 6.3).
As before, we conduct comparative static exercises under two di⁄erent sets of simplifying as-
sumptions to obtain analytic solutions.
Hicks-neutral technology and asymmetric countries: We ￿rst consider the speci￿cation of
our model with e ’ = 1=2 so that technology is Hicks-neutral. In this case, the cost of the factor
bundle can be disentangled from the productivity z, so that the cost ck








The cost of supplying country 1 (omitting the dependence on sector j) is (i) v1=z1 if production is
carried-out in country 1 using country 1￿ s productivity; (ii) ￿v2=z2 if production is carried-out in
country 2 using country 2￿ s productivity and output is exported to country 1; (iii) ￿m21v1A1=A2z2 if
production is carried-out in country 1 via MP (using country 2￿ s productivity); and, (iv) ￿￿m12v2A2
=A1z1 if production is carried-out in country 2 via MP and output is exported to country 1. Each
good is supplied by the lowest cost of the four alternatives, which is determined by factor prices,
productivity draws, trade costs, and MP costs.
We now derive analytic results on the impact of changes in MP costs on the skill premium under
assumptions GEN and HN. We solve for our model as in Subsection 3.1, where ￿in (j) is now the
fraction of subsectors in sector j that are supplied in country n by producers located in country i,
de￿ned as















With Hicks-neutral technology, MP does not a⁄ect the relative demand for skill within a sector
at ￿xed factor costs because skill intensity is common across all producers in that sector; MP
can only a⁄ect the between-sector allocation of factors. In the absence of international trade,
￿nn (j) = 1 so MP does not a⁄ect the between-sector allocation of factors either. Combining these
two implications, we obtain the result that, in the absence of international trade, the cost of MPGlobalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 25
has no impact on the skill premium.
Consider now the case with international trade. As the cost of MP decreases, the expected
technological gap across locations decreases. With international trade, this increases the importance
of factor endowment and sectoral technology di⁄erences in determining the pattern of specialization.
Hence, as ￿ and mki decline, a country moves towards specializing in its comparative advantage
sector, as in the model with no technological dispersion (￿ ! 0). In fact, under Assumptions GEN
and HN, the skill premium with costless MP is equivalent to the skill premium with no technological
dispersion.
Proposition 4 summarizes these two results.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions GEN and HN hold and that A1 (j) = A2 (j) for j = x;y.
Then





wl for l = 1;2.
The central implication of Proposition 4 is that a lower MP cost strengthens the between e⁄ect
by making the systematic components of comparative advantage (i.e. factor endowments and
sectoral productivities) more important in determining patterns of specialization. That is, trade
liberalization has a larger e⁄ect on the skill premium in both countries in the presence of costless
MP. We return to this in our quantitative analysis.
Skill-biased technology and symmetric countries: We now consider the impact of MP on
the skill-premium in the speci￿cation of our model with skill-biased technology and two symmetric
countries.
A reduction in the cost of MP￿ from a level at which there is a positive volume of MP, ￿ < ￿￿
increases the skill premium. If ￿ < ￿, then a reduction in MP costs increases the fraction of
subsectors in a country that produce using foreign productivity. If a domestic subsector produces
using foreign productivity, producers in the foreign subsector must be more productive than those
in the domestic one. Hence, a reduction in MP costs weakly increases the productivity of all
subsectors and strictly increases the productivity of some subsectors. With skill-biased technology,
relatively productive subsectors are also relatively skill intensive. Hence, reductions in the cost of
MP increase the relative demand for skill and the skill premium. Proposition 5 summarizes this
result.
Proposition 5 If Assumptions GEN and SB hold and ￿ < ￿, then si=wi is strictly decreasing in
￿ for i = 1;2.
Note that Proposition 5 holds even in the absence of positive trade ￿ ows. This is in contrast
to the case of Hicks-neutral technology, in which MP does not impact the skill premium in the
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6.2 Baseline Parameterization and Results with Trade and MP
In this section, we discuss how we parameterize the extended model with international trade and
MP and study the quantitative implications of a reduction in trade and MP costs for the skill
premium.
Parameterization with trade and MP: To calibrate the model with MP, we assume that the
country/subsector-speci￿c e¢ ciency loss of MP, min (!;j), is given by 1+e u, where e u ￿ 0 is an i:i:d:
random variable that is exponentially distributed with mean and standard deviation ￿m. We also
assume that the country-level MP cost, ￿in, is symmetric between pairs of countries, ￿ni = ￿in,
and is equal in the tradeable and nontradeable sectors. We allow for MP in the non-traded sector
because in 2006 more than half of majority-owned non-bank US foreign a¢ liate sales are in service-
producing sectors.
The new, MP-speci￿c parameters that we must choose are the country-level per-unit costs
of MP (￿12, ￿13, and ￿34) and the parameter that governs the mean and standard deviation of
country/subsector-speci￿c MP costs, ￿m. We set ￿34 = 1 since most MP originates from skill-
abundant source countries (see Navaretti and Venables 2004) and choose ￿12 and ￿13 to match
the two following observations on US outward multinational activity in 2006, obtained from the
BEA: (i) the sum of the total sales of majority-owned non-bank US foreign a¢ liates (i.e. outward
MP) and the total sales of majority-owned non-bank US a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms (i.e. inward
MP), divided by the sum of US imports and exports of merchandise, which is 2:40; and (ii) the
share of US outward MP to and inward MP from skill abundant countries, which is 0:91.27 We set
￿m = 0:1. We considered alternative values of this parameter, ￿m = 0:2 and ￿m = 1, and found
that the change in the skill premium was largely una⁄ected. The remaining parameters are chosen
using the same procedure described in Section 4. Column 2 of Tables 1 and 2 report the parameter
values and calibration targets in the model with trade and MP.
Baseline results with trade and MP: We now study the implications of international trade
and MP for the skill premium. To do so, we use our parameterized model to conduct the following
counterfactual. We consider a reduction in trade and MP costs starting in autarky to the levels of
trade and MP costs that generate the volumes of international trade and MP observed in 2006, while
holding ￿xed all other parameters at our baseline level. This exercise extends the counterfactual
conducted in Section 5 by incorporating MP. As in Section 5, one way to interpret this counterfactual
is that it answers the question: But for international trade and MP, by how much would the skill
premium change?
Rows 12 and 13 in Table 2 report the log-percentage change in the skill premium resulting from
27Note in Table 1 that our calibration with trade and MP requires a high ￿13 = 4:7. This is because country 3
has a low relative TFP, so that producers from countries 1 and 2 have a large incentive to produce in country 3. An
alternative strategy to match our targets is to assume a lower location-speci￿c TFP in country 3, as in Burstein and
Monge-Naranjo (2008). This does not have a signi￿cant impact on our baseline calibration.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 27
this experiment. The US and the other skill-abundant country (countries 1 and 2) experience a
4:8% increase in the skill premium while the two skill-scarce countries (countries 3 and 4) experience
a 6:5% increase in the skill premium.
The two central messages from these results are as follows. First, MP appears to be at least as
important as international trade in determining the impact of globalization on the skill premium:
incorporating both international trade and MP implies an increase in the skill premium that is
almost three times as large in countries 1 and 2 (4:8% compared to 1:8%) and more than two times
as large in countries 3 and 4 (6:5% compared to 2:9%) as our counterfactual incorporating only
international trade.
Second, in contrast to the model with trade only, the magnitudes of the changes in the skill
premium of moving from autarky to 2006 levels of trade and MP are sizeable. To put the 4:8%
rise of the skill premium in country 1 in perspective, it represents 1=5 of the 24% rise in the US
College-High School wage gap between 1966 and 2006. However, the world in 1966 was not in
autarky, which motivates the counterfactual we conduct in the following section.
6.3 Accounting for the US Skill Premium, 1966 to 2006
In what follows, we conduct an additional counterfactual to assess the contribution of globalization
to the actual rise in the US skill premium between 1966 and 2006, taking into account the rise
in the supply of skilled labor and the greater growth of skill-scarce countries while matching the
observed rise in the levels of trade and MP. We choose 1966 as a base year because it is the earliest
year for which we have (outward) MP data for the US.
We ￿rst partially reparameterize the model to 1966 data. In order to match the growth in the
US skill premium between 1966 and 2006, given that in this period there was an increase in the
relative supply of skilled labor, we must allow for an additional force to increase the skill premium,
which we assume to be exogenous skill-biased technical change; see e.g. Acemoglu (2002). We then
ask, by how much would the skill premium in the US have risen if endowments and technologies
had evolved as in our parameterization, but the US were in autarky? One way to interpret this
counterfactual is that it answers the question: But for globalization, by how much would the skill
premium have changed in the US between 1966 and 2006?28
1966 Parameterization: We re-calibrate the following nine parameters: (i)￿(ii) skill endowment
ratios, H1=L1 and H3=L3; (iii) the tradeable share in ￿nal output, ￿; (iv) aggregate TFP in country
3, T3; (v) ￿ (vii) trade costs, ￿12, ￿13, and ￿34; and (viii) ￿ (ix) MP costs, ￿12 and ￿13. For (i),
we set H1=L1 = 0:51 to match the 40% growth between 1966 and 2006 in the average years of
28Note that by calculating the rise in the US skill premium from changes in endowments and technologies assuming
that the US is in autarky, we are attributing to globalization the impact on the skill premium from the interaction
between changes in endowments, technologies, international trade, and MP. An alternative accounting strategy that
keeps trade and MP costs constant between 1966 and 2006 implies a smaller role for globalization because US trade
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education for the US population over age 25. For (ii) ￿ (vii) we use the same procedure as in our
2006 parameterization, using data from 1966 or the closest year with available information.29 In
choosing parameters (viii) and (ix), we do not have 1966 data on inward MP in the US. We impute
this data by assuming that the 1977 ratio of outward MP to inward MP (i.e. the earliest year with
available data) is the same as in 1966. Given the imputed level of inward MP, we target the sum
of outward and imputed inward MP divided by the sum of US imports and exports of merchandise
(as in our 2006 parameterization), which is 2:29. Because we do not have data on inward MP, we
target the 2006 share of US outward MP to and inward MP from skill abundant countries, which is
0:91.30 We also consider a parameterization with only trade in both 1966 and 2006, in which MP
costs are set to in￿nity in both years.
Finally, to match the observed 24% increase in the US skill premium between 1966 and 2006,
we include one additional parameter￿ the aggregate skill-bias of technology￿ which we assume to
be common across countries and sectors and varying across time. In particular, we extend the
producer-level production function, Equation (2), to allow for exogenous skill-biased technological
growth, which is parameterized by Ah:

















We maintain Ah = 1 in 2006, in which case Equations (2) and (15) are identical, and choose Ah in
1966 as a residual to fully match the 24% growth in the skill premium in the US between 1966 and
2006.
Table 3 displays the parameter values and the calibration targets that we vary between 1966
and 2006. Given the large rise in the relative supply of skilled workers in the US, our model requires
a large rise in the skill bias of technology, Ah, to match the 24% increase in the US skill premium.
Accounting results: By how much would the skill premium in country 1 have changed if en-
dowments and technologies had evolved as in our parameterization, but country 1 were in autarky
in 1966 and in 2006? If the skill premium in country 1 rose by X% in autarky, then we would
conclude that, in the absence of globalization, the rise in country 1￿ s skill premium would have
been (1 ￿ X=24)% smaller than in the presence of globalization. We answer this question using
the parameterization with trade only and the parameterization with both trade and MP.
In the parameterization with trade and MP (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3), we ￿nd that the
skill premium in country 1 would have risen 21:3% in autarky between 1966 and 2006. From this
29These moments are: the ratio of endowment ratios in the skill-abundant countries relative to the unskill-abundant
countries in 1966, (H1=L1)=(H3=L3) = 0:32; the US share of good producing sectors in gross output, 0:49; the US
trade share in tradeable sectors, 0:041; the average skill-scarce country￿ s total trade share, 0:048; the share of US
imports from skill-abundant countries, 0:89; and the share of skill-scarce countries￿trade (exports plus imports) with
skill-scarce countries, 0:08.
30As a check, the share of US outward MP to skill-abundant countries in 1966 is 0:87, which is close to our target
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counterfactual we conclude that, but for globalization, the skill premium would have risen about
11% less than what it actually did in the US between 1966 and 2006. To show that MP is at least as
important as international trade, columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, report that in the parameterization
with only trade, the skill premium in country 1 would have risen 23:2% in autarky between 1966
and 2006. From this counterfactual we conclude that, but for international trade, the skill premium
would have risen about 4% less than what it actually did in the US between 1966 and 2006.
Accounting results in an alternative parameterization: We also consider a less conservative
parameterization in which we choose parameter values so that, given trade and MP shares, the
between and within e⁄ects are strengthened. In particular, we make four changes from our baseline
parameterization. First, we increase the skill bias of technology, from ’ = 0:33 to ’ = 0:4. This
alternative value of ’ raises e ’ to its maximum value of e ’ = 1. Second, we increase the dispersion
of idiosyncratic productivity from ￿ = 0:2 to ￿ = 0:25. This alternative value is at the high end of
the range of ￿￿ s used in the literature. Third, we increase the share of tradeables in ￿nal output in
both years to match the total share of trade in output in country 1 including trade in both goods
and services rather than only in goods, as discussed in Section 5.1.4. Finally, we raise country
3￿ s Ricardian comparative advantage in unskill-intensive sectors (t3) to increase country 1￿ s factor
content of trade in the tradeable sector in 2006 from 0:018 to 0:048. This addresses concerns, see
e.g. Krugman (2008) and Feenstra (2010), that aggregation at the sector level may bias downward
the estimated factor content of trade and thus lead to arti￿cially low estimates of the strength of
the between e⁄ect.
In the parameterization with trade and MP (columns 7 and 8 of Table 3), we ￿nd that, but for
globalization, the skill premium would have risen about 19% less than what it actually did in the
US between 1966 and 2006.31
While globalization can account for 1=9th of the rise in the US skill premium between 1966 and
2006 in our preferred parameterization and 1=5th in our more extreme parameterization, we con-
clude from these counterfactuals that the combination of other forces in shaping the skill premium
is signi￿cantly more important than our model￿ s within and between e⁄ects of globalization.
7 Implications for Alternative Approaches
Others in the literature have reached the conclusion that globalization is not as important as the
combination of other forces in shaping the evolution of the US skill premium. In this section, we use
our model and quantitative results to revisit three common alternative approaches that have been
used in the international trade and labor literatures to reach this conclusion. We show that while
each of these alternative approaches may provide estimates of the impact of globalization on the
31In the parameterization with only trade (columns 5 and 6 of Table 3), we ￿nd that, but for international trade,
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skill premium via the between e⁄ect, they do not capture the impact of the within e⁄ect. Hence,
they tend to underestimate the increase in the skill premium from globalization in skill-abundant
and skill-scarce countries.
The factor content of trade: As stated in Krugman (2000), ￿...many economists studying
the impact of trade on wages have been reluctant to commit themselves to a speci￿c CGE model.
Instead, they have tried to use a shortcut, by estimating the ￿ factor content￿of trade.￿According to
Proposition 1, this approach is justi￿ed in our model under Assumptions GEN and HN. Because the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is not equal to one (an assumption
imposed in Assumption HN), the typical approach to estimating the percentage change in the skill
premium is to multiply the factor content of trade for the entire economy by the inverse of the
aggregate elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers.
We investigate to what extent this is an accurate approach to determining the change in the
skill premium from a reduction in trade costs in our general model, in which we do not impose
Assumptions GEN and HN. To do so we replicate the FCT exercise on data generated by our
model with trade and MP and compare the estimated changes in the skill premium with the actual
changes in the skill premium that result from the full model.
Consider ￿rst a parameterization of the model in which we impose that technology is Hicks-
neutral (’ = 0), so that only the between e⁄ect is active, and otherwise follow our baseline cal-
ibration procedure. In this case, the actual change in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 is
0:28% and ￿1:0%, respectively. According to the FCT approach, the change in the skill premium in
countries 1 and 3 is 0:35% and ￿1:4%, respectively. Although the results are not exactly identical
because our quantitative model does not satisfy Assumptions GEN and HN, the FCT approach
quite accurately captures the impact of globalization, via the between e⁄ect, on the skill premium.
Consider now the baseline parameterization of the model with skill-biased technology. In this
case, the actual change in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 is 4:8% and 6:5%, respectively.
According to the FCT approach, the change in the skill premium in countries 1 and 3 is 0:34%
and ￿1:4%, respectively. With skill-biased technology, the FCT approach predicts a change in the
skill premium that is very di⁄erent from the actual change in the skill premium implied by the
model. It predicts the change in the skill premium with the incorrect sign in skill-scarce countries,
and underestimates by an order of magnitude the change in the skill premium in skill-abundant
countries.
The FCT approach does well with Hicks-neutral technology and poorly with skill-biased tech-
nology because the assumptions underlying the approach are reasonable in the prior case￿ in which
all producers in a sector share the same skill intensity￿ but not the latter case￿ in which (in both
countries) the skill intensity of a typical exporting producer is relatively high compared to the skill
intensity of a typical producer that is replaced by imports.
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between-sector (and within-sector) factor reallocation, as in, for example, Berman et. al. (1994).
Intuitively, if international trade causes a substantial increase in the relative demand for skill via
the between e⁄ect, then it must also generate substantial shifts in the sectoral distribution of
employment towards skill-intensive sectors. At ￿xed factor supplies, this requires within-sector
reductions in skill intensities in all sectors. However, empirical studies document both within-
industry increases in the share of skilled workers￿ see e.g. Berman et. al. (1994) for the US￿ and
relatively little between-sector labor reallocation￿ see e.g. Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco,
Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico, and Attanasio et. al. (2004) for Colombia. These ￿ndings
have been interpreted as evidence that globalization is not responsible for much of the rise in
inequality.
Instead, we interpret these empirical results as evidence that the between e⁄ect is not responsible
for much of the rise in the skill premium, but not as evidence against the combined impact of the
between and within e⁄ects. In our model, a rise in the skill premium can accompany small changes
in the sectoral allocation of factors. To see this, note that under Assumptions GEN and SB we
proved in Proposition 3 that reductions in trade costs increase the skill premium in a one-sector
model in which, by construction, there is no between-sector factor reallocation.32
Sectoral prices and the mandated wage approach: The basic mandated wage approach takes
changes in observed sectoral prices, which are often assumed to result from international trade, and
attempts to identify the mandated change in factor prices that are consistent with maintaining
zero pro￿ts, given factor intensities; see, e.g., Sachs and Shatz (1994). Using this approach, the
observation that large increases in the skill premium in the US have not been accompanied by
large increases in the relative price of skill-intensive sectors has been interpreted as evidence that
globalization is not responsible for much or any of the rise in inequality; see e.g. Lawrence and
Slaughter (1993). This conclusion follows from the following logic. Globalization raises the skill
premium if and only if globalization raises the relative price of skill-intensive sectors, all else equal.
All else, however, is not equal. For example, skill-biased technological change changes relative
goods prices for given factor prices. A similar mechanism to skill-biased technological change is
at work in our model with skill-biased technology. Globalization a⁄ects sectoral absorption prices,
Pi (j), through two channels. First, it increases the relative price of sectors intensive in the locally
abundant factor, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Second, in our parameterization with skill-biased
technology, globalization leads to a greater increase in trade volumes in skill-intensive sectors.33
This decreases the relative price of skill-intensive goods, similar to skill-biased technological change.
32In our baseline parameterization with trade and MP, moving from autarky to 2006 levels of globalization we
obtain a 4:8% increase in the skill premium in country 1 while the increase in the share of manufacturing labor
employed in the 50% most skill intensive sectors that results from this liberalization is only 2:8% in country 1.
33That reductions in trade costs increase trade more in skill-intensive sectors is not an unambiguous prediction of
the model. Indeed, one can show that the growth of trade in skill-intensive sectors is higher (lower) at high (low)
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These two channels push relative sectoral prices in opposite directions in a skill-abundant country
(such as the US). Figure 6 displays the percentage change in sectoral absorption prices of tradeable
sectors in country 1 that results from moving from autarky to our baseline level of trade and MP.
Note that the relative price of skill-intensive sectors falls because the within e⁄ect is more powerful
than the between e⁄ect.
Our model, therefore, provides a mechanism by which globalization can jointly increase the
skill premium and decrease the relative price of skill-intensive goods. The mandated wage ap-
proach, however, would not attribute the rise in the skill premium generated by this mechanism to
globalization.34
8 Conclusions
We have constructed a quantitative model of international trade and multinational production to
study the impact of globalization on the skill premium in skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.
The key mechanisms in our framework arise from the interaction between three elements: cross-
country di⁄erences in factor endowments and sectoral productivities, technological heterogeneity
across producers within sectors, and skill-biased technology. By combining these three elements,
our model includes both the between e⁄ect and the within e⁄ect of globalization on the skill pre-
mium. We have shown that within-sector heterogeneity can (i) rationalize the ￿nding￿ in previous
empirical studies￿ that the between e⁄ect is weak, and (ii) generate a stronger within e⁄ect, which
can lead to a rise in the skill premium in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. We have
also shown that multinational production strengthens both the between and within e⁄ects of global-
ization on the skill premium. We used our framework to investigate the impact on the skill premium
of changes in the extent (the share of trade and MP in output), the geographical composition (the
relative importance of skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries in the world economy), and the type
(international trade and MP) of globalization.
We have shown that a reduction in trade and MP costs starting in autarky to our baseline
parameterization of 2006￿ holding ￿xed all other parameters at our baseline level￿ increases the
skill premium by 4:8% in the US (and other skill-abundant countries) and 6:5% in the average
skill-scarce country. One way to interpret this counterfactual is that it answers the question: But
for international trade and MP, by how much would the skill premium change? We then showed
that globalization accounts for about 1=9th of the 24% rise in the US skill premium between 1966
and 2006. Multinational production is at least as important as international trade in generating
this rise in the skill premium.
Whereas in this paper we capture two important forces in the debate on globalization and the
34Feenstra and Hanson (1999) provide a richer version of the mandated wage approach that controls for technological
change. Their approach provides an estimate of the impact of globalization, through the between e⁄ect, on the skill
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skill premium￿ the between and within e⁄ects￿ and incorporate both trade and MP, we abstract
from other interesting and potentially important considerations discussed in the literature. For
example, our model abstracts from additional factors of production (such as land, other natural
resources, and capital) in order to focus on the impact of globalization on the skill premium.
Additionally, our framework does not incorporate endogenous changes in the supply of skilled and
unskilled labor, endogenous skill-biased technical change, product or process innovation, or capital
accumulation with capital-skill complementarity.35 Our analysis also abstracts from unemployment
and within-group inequality.36 Finally, our model abstracts from non-homothetic preferences, which
can lead to di⁄erences between changes in the nominal and the real skill premia.37 Extending our
model along these directions is a fruitful area for future research to fully assess the quantitative
e⁄ects of globalization on inequality.
Finally, the mechanisms studied in this paper apply equally well to intra-national integration
as to international integration. The e⁄ects of intra-national integration on the skill premium could
prove quantitatively large given the high volumes of intra-national trade relative to international
trade in the US.
A Trade Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove Proposition 1 with arbitrarily many countries, factors, and sectors. In
particular, we impose the following restrictions on our general model: ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1, and e ’ = 1=2. In the
speci￿cation of the model in which ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1, and e ’ = 1=2, the labor market clearing conditions for

















where ￿in (j) is de￿ned in Equation (12). Equations (16) and (17) are derived as follows. With a constant
and equal share of expenditure allocated to each sector, the value of country i￿ s production supplied to
country n in sector j is given by ￿in (j)QnPn=J. With Cobb-Douglas production functions and perfect
competition, the payments to each type of labor in each sector is given by the product of the constant factor
shares and the total value of production in that sector. Using the factor market clearing conditions, the skill













j=1 (1 ￿ ￿j)￿in (j)QnPn
. (18)
35See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991), Acemoglu (2003), Atkeson and Burstein (2009), and Krusell et. al.
(2000), respectively
36See e.g., Davidson et. al. (1988) and Helpman et. al. (2008), respectively.
37See e.g. Broda and Romalis (2009) for an empirical investigation of this issue.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 34
In addition to skilled and unskilled labor, we consider F ￿ 0 additional factors, indexed by f = 1;:::;F.
We denote by ￿f (j) > 0 the factor f intensity of production in sector j, where ￿H (j)+￿L (j)+
PF
f=1 ￿f (j) =
1. We re-express NXL
i =
PJ
j=1 Li (j)￿i (j) and NXH
i =
PJ


















￿H (j)[￿in (j)QnPn ￿ ￿ni (j)QiPi], (20)
which are well de￿ned even if country i produces no output in sector j. Equations (19) and (20) are derived
as follows. The value of country i￿ s net exports in sector j is 1
J
P
n6=i [￿in (j)QnPn ￿ ￿ni (j)QiPi]. The
share of revenues paid to unskilled workers and skilled workers is ￿L (j) and ￿H (j), respectively. Summing
across sectors yields the right-hand side of Equations (19) and (20), which represent the value of unskilled
and skilled labor, respectively, that is embodied in country i￿ s net exports. There are F similar equations,
one for each additional factor.
To show that changes in NXL
i and NXH
i pin down changes in the skill premium that result from trade,
we proceed as follows. Equation (16), Equation (17), and ￿ii (j) = 1 ￿
P

































































The Proposition directly follows from Equation (21). QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. After setting out the necessary notation we provide two preliminary steps before
proving the proposition. Denote by ￿i = 1
2 [￿￿ii (x) + ￿￿ii (y)] for i = 1;2 country i￿ s expenditure share of
trade and by ￿3 = ￿21 (y)￿￿21 (x) the di⁄erence in import shares between sector x and sector y in country
1.
Step 1. If ￿, ￿0, a, a0, ￿, and ￿
0 are chosen such that ￿3 > ￿0
3 ￿ 0, ￿1 = ￿0
1 > 0, and ￿2 = ￿0
2 > 0,
then (i) ￿12 (x) > ￿0
12 (x), (ii) ￿12 (y) < ￿0
12 (y), (iii) ￿21 (x) < ￿0
21 (x), (iv) ￿21 (y) > ￿0




We ￿rst show that ￿3 > ￿0
3 ￿ 0, ￿1 = ￿0
1 > 0, and ￿2 = ￿0
2 > 0 imply conditions (i)￿(iv). Conditions
(iii) and (iv) follow from
￿21 (x) = ￿1 ￿
1
2







￿21 (y) = ￿1 +
1
2



























































































































Equations (12) and (26) imply Condition (ii), which, in turn, implies Condition (i).






￿xR1 (x) + ￿yR1 (y)
(1 ￿ ￿x)R1 (x) + (1 ￿ ￿y)R1 (y)
where Ri (j) is country i￿ s revenue in sector j. Hence, s1=w1 > s0
1=w0
1 if and only if R1 (x)R0
1 (y) >
R0
1 (x)R1 (y). ￿1 = ￿0
1 and ￿2 = ￿0




2 = ￿2=￿1 for i = 1;2. Therefore,
R1 (j) = Q2P2 [￿12 (j) + ￿11 (j)￿2=￿1] and R0
1 (j) = Q0
2P0
2 [￿0
12 (j) + ￿0
11 (j)￿2=￿1]. Together with the
de￿nition of R1 (j) and R0
1 (j), Conditions (i) ￿ (iv) imply R1 (x)R0
1 (y) > R0
1 (x)R1 (y), concluding the
proof of Step 1.
Step 2. If country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x and ￿1;￿2 > 0, then ￿3 > 0. First, note
that ￿3 > 0 and ￿0




























Third, note that ￿3 ￿ ￿0
3 > 0, ￿1 = ￿0
1 > 0, and ￿2 = ￿0























which follows from Equation (12) and Conditions (i) ￿ (iv) in Step 1.
We now use Equations (27)-(31) to prove Proposition 2. We ￿rst prove the comparative static result for
￿. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that ￿ > ￿
0, a = a0, and that ￿3 ￿ ￿0
































where the ￿rst weak inequality follows from Equation (31) and a = a0 while the second weak inequality
follows from Equations (29) and (30). Equation (32) and ￿ > ￿
0 contradict Equation (28). Thus, if a = a0,
￿ > ￿
0, and country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x, then ￿3 < ￿0
3. Combined with Condition
(v) in Step 1, this yields the desired comparative static result for ￿.
Next, we prove the comparative static result for a. To obtain a contradiction suppose that ￿ = ￿
0, a < a0,
and ￿3 ￿ ￿0






























s2=w2, which contradicts Equations (29) and (30). Thus, if
￿ = ￿
0, a < a0, and country 1 has a comparative advantage in sector x, then ￿3 < ￿0
3. Combined with
Condition (v) in Step 1, this yields the desired comparative static result for a. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. After setting out the necessary notation we provide two preliminary steps before
proving the proposition. In what follows we impose Assumptions GEN and SB.
Notation and factor market clearing: Denote by s and w the wages under trade cost ￿ and s0 and w0
the wages under trade cost ￿0. Denote by ￿ni (z;￿)
￿R 1
0 ￿ni (k;￿)dk the density of country n subsectors
with productivity z supplying country i, written explicitly as a function of the trade cost ￿. De￿ne ￿￿ii (z)
￿ ￿ii (z;￿0) ￿ ￿ii (z;￿) and ￿￿i￿i (z) ￿ ￿i￿i (z;￿0) ￿ ￿i￿i (z;￿). Denote by ￿ii (￿) the set of subsectors in
which country i producers supply their domestic market; similarly denote by ￿i￿i (￿) the set of subsectors
in which country i producers supply the foreign country.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 37
























where f and g are as de￿ned in the text, however with ￿ = 1.
Step 1: If ￿ < ￿0 and w=s ￿ w0=s0, then ! 2 ￿ii (￿) implies ! 2 ￿ii (￿0).
Let ￿ < ￿0 and w=s ￿ w0=s0 and suppose that ! 2 ￿ii (￿), which is equivalent to
cii(!;￿)
c￿ii(!;￿) ￿ 1, where
cni (!;￿) is the unit cost of country n supplying country i in subsector ! at trade cost ￿. There are two





c￿ii(!;￿) ￿ 1, since
cii(!;￿)
c￿ii(!;￿) is weakly increasing in w=s if z￿i (!) ￿ zi (!) and is strictly decreasing in ￿.
Hence, in case (i) we have ! 2 ￿ii (￿0). In case (ii), we have ! 2 ￿ii (￿00) for any ￿00 ￿ 1; and in particular,
! 2 ￿ii (￿0). Thus, if ￿ < ￿0 and w=s ￿ w0=s0, then ! 2 ￿ii (￿) implies ! 2 ￿ii (￿0), concluding the proof of
Step 1.
Step 2: If ￿ < ￿0 and w=s ￿ w0=s0, then ￿
R z
0 ￿￿i￿i (v)dv <
R z
0 ￿￿ii (v)dv for all z > 0, j = x;y, and
i = 1;2.
Let ￿ < ￿0 and w=s ￿ w0=s0 and suppose that ! = 2 ￿ii (￿). Then
cii(!;￿)






c￿ii(!;￿0). Thus, there must exist a positive mass of ! for which ! = 2 ￿ii (￿) and !
2 ￿ii (￿0) for i = 1;2.38 Choose an arbitrary ! such that ! = 2 ￿ii (￿) and ! 2 ￿ii (￿0). Then ! 2 ￿￿ii (￿),
! = 2 ￿￿ii (￿0), and z￿i (!) > zi (!). Moreover, for any ! there is a positive probability that ! = 2 ￿ii (￿) and
! 2 ￿ii (￿0) (so that ! 2 ￿￿ii (￿) and ! = 2 ￿￿ii (￿0)). Hence,
Pr[z￿i (!) < z j ! 2 ￿￿ii (￿)n￿￿ii (￿0)] < Pr[zi (!) < z j ! 2 ￿ii (￿0)n￿ii (￿)]

















, for all z > 0 (35)
By symmetry: (i) ￿￿ii (z) = ￿i￿i (z) for almost all z, and (ii)
R 1
0 ￿￿￿￿ii (v)dv =
R 1
0 ￿￿ii (v)dv. Thus,








0 ￿￿ii (v)dv for all z > 0, j = x;y, and i = 1;2,
concluding the proof of Step 2.
We now use Steps 1 and 2 to prove the proposition. Consider an arbitrary pair of trade costs 1 ￿ ￿ < ￿0,
and to obtain a contradiction, suppose that w=s ￿ w0=s0. According to Equation (11), and our normalization





























38This requires that the density of subsectors drawing a productivity z must be positive for all z, but is otherwise

























Equation (36) contradicts Equation (37). Therefore, if ￿ < ￿0, then w=s < w0=s0. QED.
B Trade and MP Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. From Equations (16) and (17), we have lim￿!1 H1s1 = 1
2Q1P1 (￿x + ￿y)
and lim￿!1 L1w1 = 1
2Q1P1 (2 ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿y). Hence, lim￿!1 (s1=w1) = (￿x + ￿y)=(2 ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿y), so that
d
d￿ lim￿!1 (s1=w1) = 0. Similarly, we have d
d￿ lim￿!1 (s2=w2) = 0, concluding the proof of Part 1 of
Proposition 4.
The cost of MP and ￿ a⁄ect the equations determining wages, Equations (16) and (17), through the
￿in (j) terms. To prove Part 2, we show that in the limit as MP becomes costless, the ￿in (j) terms have
the same solution as in the limit as the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity converges to zero. We focus
here on ￿21 (j), but the proof for all other ￿in (j) terms is similar.
With trade and MP we have

































o ￿ v1 (j)
3
5.













o converges to one, so that ￿21 (j) converges
to Pr[￿v2 (j) ￿ v1 (j)]. With only trade we have
￿21 (j) = Pr[￿v2 (j)=z2 (!;j) ￿ v1 (j)=z1 (!;j)]
= Pr[￿v2 (j) ￿ v1 (j)z2 (!;j)=z1 (!;j)].
In the limit, as the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity converges to zero, z2 (!;j)=z1 (!;j) converges
to one, so that ￿21 (j) converges to Pr[￿v2 (j) ￿ v1 (j)], the same as above. Hence, the skill premium is the
same in the limit as trade and MP costs converge to zero as in the limit (with only trade) as the dispersion
of idiosyncratic productivity converges to zero. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of Proposition 5 follows very closely the proof of Proposition 3. After
setting out the necessary notation we provide a preliminary step before proving the proposition. In what
follows we impose Assumptions GEN and SB.
Notation and factor market clearing: Denote by s and w the wages in both countries under MP




ni (z;￿)dz the density of
39This follows from the fact that if
R z
0 f (v)dv <
R z
0 g (v)dv for any z > 0, and h
0 (z) < 0, then
R 1
0 f (v)h(v)dv < R 1
0 g (v)h(v)dv.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 39
productivities of subsectors in country n that supply market i using productivity from country k, written
explicitly as a function of the MP cost ￿. Note that with symmetric countries we have ￿
￿i
i￿i (z;￿) = 0 because
c
￿i
i￿i (!) > c
￿i
￿i￿i (!). Let ￿￿k
ni (z) ￿ ￿k
ni (z;￿0) ￿ ￿k
ni (z;￿). Finally, denote by ￿k
ni (￿) the set of subsectors
in which country n producers supply country i using country k￿ s productivity.












ii (z;￿) + ￿i
















ii (z;￿) + ￿i





where f and g are as de￿ned in the text, however with ￿ = 1.











ii (z) + ￿￿i
i￿i (z)
￿
dv for all z > 0 and i = 1;2.
Let 1 < ￿ < minf￿0,￿g and w=s ￿ w0=s0 and suppose that ! 2 ￿i
ii (￿). As in the proof of Proposition
3, it is easy to show that if ￿ < minf￿0,￿g and w=s ￿ w0=s0, then (i) ! 2 ￿i
ii (￿) implies ! 2 ￿i
ii (￿0);
(ii) ! 2 ￿i
i￿i (￿) implies ! 2 ￿i
i￿i (￿0); (iii) there exist a positive mass of ! for which ! = 2 ￿i
ii (￿) and
! 2 ￿i
ii (￿0); (iv) there exist a positive mass of ! for which ! = 2 ￿i
i￿i (￿) and ! 2 ￿i
i￿i (￿0); and (v) there
exist a positive mass of ! 2 ￿
￿i
ii (￿) for which ! = 2 ￿
￿i
ii (￿).40
Choose an arbitrary ! = 2 ￿i
ii (￿)[￿
￿i
￿ii (￿) and ! 2 ￿i
ii (￿0)[￿
￿i
￿ii (￿0). Then ! 2 ￿
￿i
ii (￿), ! = 2 ￿
￿i
ii (￿0),
and z￿i (!) > zi (!). We have z￿i (!) > zi (!), because, if z￿i (!) ￿ zi (!) then no MP would take place for
any ￿ > 1, contradicting ! 2 ￿
￿i
ii (￿). And if ! = 2 ￿
￿i
￿ii (￿) and ! 2 ￿
￿i
￿ii (￿0), then the e¢ ciency of production
in subsector ! is una⁄ected, since country ￿i￿ s productivity is used under either ￿ or ￿0. Nevertheless, for
any ! there is a positive probability that ! = 2 ￿i
ii (￿), ! 2 ￿i
ii (￿0), ! = 2 ￿
￿i













zi (!) < z j ! 2
￿
￿i


















































￿ii (z) = ￿i































ii (v) + ￿￿i
i￿i (v)
￿
dv, 8z > 0, i = 1;2
40If ￿ ￿ ￿, then no o⁄shoring takes place, so that decreasing ￿
0 to ￿ has no impact on the equilibrium.Globalization, Technology, and the Skill Premium 40
completing the proof of the Preliminary Step.
Consider an arbitrary pair of MP costs satisfying 1 < ￿ < minf￿0,￿g. To obtain a contradiction, suppose
that w=s ￿ w0=s0. According to Condition (11), and our normalization wL + sH = 1, this implies w￿ ￿ w0
and s ￿ s0. Equation (34), the condition that w ￿ w0, and the fact that d



















































Equation (40) contradicts Equation (41). Thus, if ￿ < minf￿0;￿g, then w=s < w0=s0. QED.
C Additional Proofs
Proposition 6 If Assumptions GEN and SB￿ hold (where SB￿ is a two-sector version of SB in which
￿x > ￿y), then normalized trade in each country is greater in the skill-intensive sector.
Proof. Suppose Assumptions GEN and SB￿hold and ￿x an arbitrary pair of productivities zi ￿ zi (!;y) =





the mass of subsectors that export from country i in the skill-intensive x sector is strictly greater than the
mass that export from the unskill-intensive y sector, for all i. With ￿ = 1, this implies that the value of a
country￿ s exports plus its imports is greater in the x sector than in the y sector. Finally, with ￿ = 1, the
value of a country￿ s consumption is equal in the x and y sectors. Hence, normalized trade is strictly greater
in the skill-intensive sector, concluding the proof of Proposition 6. QED.
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1 Skill‐bias of technology, ϕ 0.328 0.328
2 Dispersion of productivities, θ 0.2 0.2
3 Demand elasticity across sub‐sectors and sectors, σ=η 2.7 2.7
4 Elasticity of substitution skilled‐unskilled labor, ρ 1.2 1.2
5 Share of tradeables in final output, γ 0.261 0.261
Endowments
6 Skill‐unskill endowment ratio country 1, H1/L1 0.71 0.71
7 Skill‐unskill endowment ratio country 3, H3/L3 0.348 0.348
8 Aggregate total factor productivity country 3, T3 0.290 0.283
9 Sectoral productivity differences, t3 0.056 0.050
Trade costs
10 Between countries 1 and 2, τ₁₂ 1.295 1.212
11 Between countries 1 and 3, τ₁₃ 1.305 1.296
12 Between countries 3 and 4, τ₃₄ 1.230 1.225
Multinational Production
13 Dispersion of idisoyncratic MP costs, θm ‐ 0.1
14 Country‐level MP cost between Countries 1 and 2, μ₁₂ ‐ 4.684









1 1/2*(exports+imports)/ tradeable output, country 1 0.253 0.252 0.253
1/2*(exports+imports)/ tradeable output, country 3 0.508 0.511 Not a target
1/2*(exports+imports)/total output, country 1 0.066 0.066 Not a target
2 1/2*(exports+imports)/total output, country 3 0.133 0.133 0.133
3 Share of imports in country 1 from country 2 0.591 0.598 0.588
4 Share of country 3's trade between countries 3 and 4 0.208 0.209 0.206
5 Factor content of trade in tradeables, country 1 0.018 0.018 0.018
6 Ratio of sales of exporters / non‐exporters, country 1 1.473 1.497 1.490
7 Skill intensitity of exporters relative to non‐exporters 0.190 0.190 0.190
    (log difference), country 3
8 Effective elasticity of substitution between skills, country 1 1.34 1.35 1.40
9 Share of tradeables in gross output 0.261 0.261 0.261
10 Ratio of outward and inward MP to exports and imports, country 1 ‐ 2.419 2.400
11 Share of country 1's outward and inward MP to country 2 ‐ 0.907 0.910
Counterfactuals
Skill Premium, log baseline/autarky
12 Country 1 and country 2 0.018 0.048
13 Country 3 and country 4 0.029 0.065Table 3: Accounting exercises
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1966 2006 1966 2006 1966 2006 1966 2006
Parameters that vary across years
1 Share of tradeables in final output, γ 0.490 0.261 0.491 0.261 0.671 0.332 0.671 0.332
2 Skill‐unskill endowment ratio country 1, H1/L1 0.509 0.710 0.509 0.710 0.509 0.710 0.509 0.710
3 Skill‐unskill endowment ratio country 3, H3/L3 0.163 0.348 0.163 0.348 0.163 0.348 0.163 0.348
4 Aggregate total factor productivity country 3, T3 0.058 0.290 0.058 0.283 0.059 0.392 0.108 0.391
5 Skill‐biased TFP, all countries 0.156 1.000 0.167 1.000 0.180 1.000 0.196 1.000
6 Trade costs between countries 1 and 2, τ₁₂ 1.561 1.295 1.427 1.212 1.849 1.383 1.489 1.251
7 Trade costs between countries 1 and 3, τ₁₃ 1.845 1.305 1.736 1.296 2.340 1.470 2.113 1.444
8 Trade costs between countries 3 and 4, τ₃₄ 1.802 1.230 1.785 1.225 2.241 1.368 2.242 1.402
9 Country‐level MP cost between countries 1 and 2, μ₁₂ ‐ ‐ 1.359 1.180 ‐‐ 1.402 1.213
10 Country‐level MP cost between countries 1 and 3, μ₁₃ ‐ ‐ 19.500 4.684 ‐‐ 12.700 4.150
Calibration targets in both years
11 1/2*(exports+imports)/ tradeable output, country 1 0.040 0.253 0.042 0.252 0.033 0.255 0.045 0.258
1/2*(exports+imports)/ tradeable output, country 3 0.092 0.508 0.088 0.511 0.069 0.397 0.056 0.395
1/2*(exports+imports)/total output, country 1 0.020 0.066 0.021 0.066 0.022 0.085 0.030 0.086
12 1/2*(exports+imports)/total output, country 3 0.045 0.133 0.043 0.133 0.046 0.132 0.038 0.131
13 Share of imports in country 1 from country 2 0.891 0.591 0.895 0.598 0.911 0.588 0.890 0.587
14 Share of country 3's trade between countries 3 and 4 0.083 0.208 0.078 0.209 0.061 0.206 0.083 0.184
15 Share of tradeables in gross output country 1 0.490 0.261 0.491 0.261 0.671 0.332 0.671 0.332
16 Ratio of outward and inward MP to exports and imports, country 1 ‐‐ 2.251 2.419 ‐‐ 1.757 1.930
17 Share of country 1's outward and inward MP to country 2 ‐‐ 0.886 0.907 ‐‐ 0.930 0.911
Log change in skill premium 1966‐2006, country 1
18 Actual (target, change in US skill premium) 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
19 Counterfactual in autarky 0.231 0.213 0.217 0.195
20 Share accounted for by globalization ( 1 ‐ [19]/[18] ) 0.040 0.110 0.098 0.188
* Target share of trade in country US including trade in services, target factor content of trade in tradeables in country 1 in 2006  = 0.05 , set ϕ = 0.4  , set θ = 0.25 
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US data